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The New Public Interest Lawyers'
At a time when our society is badly demoralized and failing to meet
the needs of many of its citizens, the traditional modes for public
service by lawyers-through working in the government1 or through
combining pro bono activities with commercial law firm practice 2-
have lost much of their effectiveness and allure. Some law students now
feel an angry despair, no longer believing it possible to play a positive
role within their prospective profession. But others have decided to
believe, with the poet, that you don't have to be a Weatherman-either
to know which way the wind is blowing, or to be a force for necessary
and fundamental change.
A source of intense interest for the present generation of law students
is the small number of practitioners outside government or corporate
law practice whose prime goal is the promotion of significant social
This Comment originated in independent work by a small group of students for
Professor Charles Reich's course, entitled "The American Corporate State," at Yale Law
School. Research was made possible by grants from the American Bar Foundation and
the Urban Studies Committee of Yale Law School.
Information was gathered through a series of in-depth interviews with numerous
lawyers who are engaged in what the authors feel may be loosely termed "public
interest law." The Journal expresses sincere thanks to these lawyers, whose names are
listed in the Appendix, both for the primary contributions which brought them to our
attention, and for their remarkably straightforward and insightful interviews. We are
especially grateful to James Lorenz, Jr., Thomas Hecht of the American Bar Foundation,
and Gary Bellow, for extensive comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. Professors
Thomas I. Emerson, Charles Reich, Quintin Johnstone, and Daniel J. Freed offered us
helpful criticism at various stages of the project. We also wish to thank Lloyd Cutler,
Charles Horsky, and Victor Kramer of the Washington bar for reading this Comment
in draft form and helping us to put the new public interest lawyers in historical and
analytic perspective.
1. Perhaps the most widely recognized way for a lawyer to serve the public interest
in the past was by working for the federal government. According to Charles Horsky,
author of The Washington Lawyer, the focus on government service developed in the
1930's. At that time, the various state governments had in large measure been taken
over by powerful, moneyed interests. Roosevelt convinced the public that there was a
significant opportunity to effect economic, social, and political change through the
federal government. Young lawyers flocked to Washington to "save the Union from the
states." In the thirties, Horsky reflects, "to join one of the federal administrative agencies
was seen as a way of fighting the enemy; now it is more often perceived as just joining
the club." Though there are certainly important differences among many of tle agencies,
critics say that they are at best demoralized and inefficient, and, at worst, the captives
of a few powerful special interest groups, much like those which had captured the state
governments in Roosevelt's time. In a very recent opinion, the Court of Appeals for
District of Columbia Circuit boldly focused the issue: "This appeal presents the recurring
question which has plagued public regulation of industry. whether the regulatory agency
is unduly oriented toward the interests of the industry it is designed to regulate, rather
than the public interest it is designed to protect." Moss v. Civil Aeronautics Board, Dkt.
No. 23,627 (D.C. Cir. July 9, 1970) (slip opinion).
2. For some observations on the past contributions of the private bar to the cause
of social change, and references to current pro bono activities of commercial law firms,
see pp. 1106-09 and notes 65 & 67 infra.
1069
The Yale Law Journal
change. The activities of these lawyers, coupled with their sense of com-
mitment and willingness to make personal sacrifices, have led publicists
to call them the new "public interest lawyers."3
3. Though we will use the term "public interest lawyer" freely in this Comment, We
would like to note that its use raises serious conceptual difficulties. See generally, G.
SCHUBERT, Tim PUBLIC INTErmsT (1960): Riley, The Challenge of the New Lawyers: Pub.
lie Interest and Private Clients, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 547 (1970).
The slipperiness of the term is well illustrated by a recent incident involving one
of the better known "public interest" lawyers, Ralph Nader. Earlier this year, Lloyd
Cutler, a Washington lawyer of considerable professional stature, led a firm team which
obtained a consent decree on behalf of automobile companies, settling before trial a
government antitrust action which charged the companies with conspiracy to Impede
the development of pollution control systems. Through Nader's promptings, a number of
law students picketed Cutler's firm to draw attention to the settlement, which they felt to
be a Justice Department sellout of the public interest. The students felt that the settle-
ment prevented a proper public airing of crucial issues, and noted that the settlement
also prevented the possibility of private treble damage actions based on the original judg.
ment, which would have been possible had the government gone to trial and prevailed.
In the midst of a press conference, in which a clearly upset Mr. Cutler accused the picket-
ing students of violating legal ethics, he asked an especially difficult question: "Why do you
think you have a monopoly on deciding what is in the public interest?"
In an interview, Mr. Cutler said that the negotiations were not "secret," as the
students had alleged; that public objections were heard and amendments made, and
that the final settlement was unanimously affirmed on appeal. According to Cutler, the
government received the relief it had sought, and it was by no means clear to those
involved that the government would have prevailed had the case actually been tried.
Cutler's press-conference question, then, appears to mean the following: if we agree
that the pluralistic political system is a fair one, the public interest can only be defined
as the outcome of the political process in which various private and group Interests
compete. Thus any lawyer representing any substantive interest in the proces can with
equal justification claim to be working towards the "public interest." Assuming that tile
process operated properly, the pollution case settlement, which was the outcome of the
process, must have been "in the public interest."
According to the pluralist theory, better decisions for society, at least over the long
run, will be produced where competing interest groups have a chance to use power,
reason, and compromise to get what they desire. Critics, however, have repeatedly noted
that the political system is not presently functioning in the fashion prescribed by pil.
ralist theory. Of many different criticisms, two are most relevant here. First, as Flenry
Kariel has emphasized, the leaders of large hierarchical organizations have Increasingly
been granted governmental recognition as quasi-official representatives and spokesmen
for their respective groups. As a result, it has become more difficult for the members
of such organizations (labor unions, corporations, professional groups) to influence pol.
icy-either directly or through their groups. Additionally the political system retains
a distinct bias against unorganized interests, or those in the process of formation. H.
KARtEL, THE DECLINE OF AtmERicAN PLuRALs x (1961).
Second, other critics have emphasized that the contemporary social structure en.
courages groups to organize politically around occupational categories, while inhibiting
effective organization on the basis of other considerations. The process therefore Ignores
concerns which the active legitimate groups fail to define as high priority Interests,
This is why environmental and consumer interests have until recently been so badly
neglected. See generally J.K. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTIUAL STATE (1967); G, McCON.
NEL, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRAcY (1966); Connolly, Tha Challenge to
Pluralist Theory, in BIAS OF PLURALISM (W. Connolly ed. 1969).
Because the lawyers we interviewed are representing social groups and interests which
are currently underrepresented in the legal and political arenas, they may be said to be
acting in the public interest by consciously attempting to correct the bias of the political
system. One problem with this approach is that to label a lawyer a "public interest
lawyer" because he is "making pluralism operative" suggests that his personal commit.
ment is to the process (i.e. is it fair? are all groups and interests being heard?), whereas
in fact he may be, and generally is, committed to realizing the substantive interests ha
represents. From the premise that the public interest is the result of a process III which
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Both the reinvigoration of government agencies and the further
development of the pro bono potential of private firms will be crucial
factors in long range social change. But many observers believe that
the new public interest lawyers will be the gadflies and catalysts for a
major reallocation of legal resources, which will stimulate the expres-
sion of important interests and values in our society and further po-
litical, economic, and social equality. What follows is an attempt to
describe and analyze some twenty-five in-depth interviews with leaders
of this new movement.
Keenly aware of the defects in our society, each of the lawyers we
interviewed has made the existential decision to act to bring change.
As a group, they have engaged in a melange of activities and have de-
veloped a number of strategies to effect the goals they seek; they have
tapped a number of different sources of funding for their new oper-
ations; they have developed distinctive relationships with clients and
groups contend, it follows that one cannot validly claim to be a "public interest lawyer"
by pointing to the merits of the particular causes he pursues. Since there is no societal
consensus about values, such a claim is merely an assertion of subjective value prefer-
ences, a game which can be played by Lloyd Cutler with as much authority as Ralph
Nader.
It is possible to step outside Cutler's premises entirely, and to fault pluralist theory
itself. This may be in essence what Nader is doing when he claims to speak out for the
public interest in his role as independent professional. For exmple, it may be argued
that the historically produced limitations of the "subdued pluralism" of modern indus-
trial society undermine any faith that decisions made through that process will produce
the best results for the whole society. As Herbert Marcuse has argued, critical social
analysis may expose "the irrationality of the whole." The competing institutions in
modem industrial society, he claims, concur in a common interest to defend and extend
their established position, and to solidify the "power of the whole over the individual."
The irrationality of the whole-of growing productivity based upon growing destruc-
tion, of technological advances used to produce weapons of death or plastic products
for a consumer society, of increasing affluence producing pervasive eluence-goes un-
noticed and unprotested. H. MARcusE, ONE-DamrSlONAL MAN xiii (1964). Under sud
circumstances, we may wish to define the public interest apart from the process of con-
tending groups. Indeed, as Barrington Moore has suggested, the pluralist conception
has "become part of what requires explanation." Moore, The Society Nobody llants:
Beyond Marxism and Liberalism, in THE C~rlacAL SpiRIT 418 (1967).
Under this "substantive" (as opposed to process-oriented) approach to defining the
public interest, an actor may be able to claim that he represents a group or interest the
advancement of which is "in the public interest." Using this approach, Ralph Nader
is asserting, from his own research and before the outcome of a long and complex pro-
cess, where the public interest lies with respect to a given issue. The value choices un-
derlying this claim may be no more subjective than the value preference which sup-
ports a faith in the outcome of the pluralist system as it presently operates. For at-
tempts at conceptualization of "the public interest," see Barry, The Public Interest, in
THE BIAS OF PLURAaSm (IV. Connolly ed. 1969); WOLFF, TUE POVEm=' OF LmEnAList
(1968); MARCUSE, supra.
Despite the slipperiness of the term "the public interest," its popularity makes its use
inconvenient to avoid. In this Comment, the term "public interest lawyers" will be
used to refer to lawyers who represent the underrepresented groups and interests in
society; the term "public interest lawyer" is applied as a word of approval, becaue the
authors believe that representation of such clients in the legal-political process will make
pluralism work better, or in some instances because we believe that the interests and groups
being represented by these lawyers are to be preferred, at least temporarily, over other
interests and groups.
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have transformed the concept of the "client;" and they have occasionally
experimented with different, freer life and working styles. The present
career role of each of our interviewees undoubtedly represents a tenta-
tive compromise between personal values and societal concerns, risk
and security, reality and dreams. Our purpose in writing this Comment
is to describe these new career roles and tentatively to evaluate their
potential as models for future development.
I. Survey: Clients, Activities, and Social Change
The lawyers to whom we talked are involved in essentially three
different pursuits: aiding the poor; representing political and cultural
dissidents and new radical movements; furthering substantive but ne-
glected interests common to all classes and races, such as environmental
quality and consumer protection. Individual lawyers and law firms
often engage in activities which serve more than one of these goals,
and of course the categories themselves overlap somewhat. Neverthe-
less, because many of the operations we will describe do have a primary
thrust, these categories will be useful for a survey of the terrain oc-
cupied by public interest lawyers. In this section, an attempt will be
made to suggest the full range of public interest work by describing the
differing activities engaged in and clients and substantive interests
represented, as well as the various theories of social change informing
specific choices of clients and modes of action. To a surprising extent,
it should be noted at the outset, the lawyers we interviewed did not
articulate either a "politics" or a theory of what was wrong with Amer-
ican society; and in many cases an individual lawyer's work lacked the
programmatic quality such a social theory would produce. But we have
at least attempted, with the help of the more theoretically inclined
lawyers we interviewed, to suggest the assumptions which underlie
the various directions in which public interest lawyers are travelling.
A. Lawyers for the Poor
Poverty is both a cause and a consequence of underrepresentation in
the legal-political process. The poor need legal services as much as
anyone else, and the profession has always recognized, at least in prin.
ciple, a duty to provide these services without regard for ability to pay.
But the poor also need legal services because they are poor; the very
fact of poverty fiercely intensifies an individual's need for legal represen-
tation in almost all facets of his life.4
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Legal services programs are one response to the dilemma of the
poor.5 The neighborhood legal services office usually assists individual
clients with occasional crises; landlord/tenant, welfare, consumer
credit, wage garnishments, and family law problems predominate.
Legal services, in theory, are to be provided without cost to every
"eligible" poor person who walks through the door. Assuming that
the political and economic order are basically sound, but that some
people are cut off, legal service efforts attempt to supply more lawyers
so that more cases can get into the legal system. The goal is to make
the legal system available to more people, so that their grievances can
be heard and channeled.
The benefits of these programs are obvious. Poor individuals are
endlessly victimized, and their rights are often violated. Legal services
programs serve a great need by attempting to remedy those individual
wrongs perpetrated against poor people that make their day-to-day
plight even more miserable. Second, lawyers in these programs must
be credited with developing much of the law of the poor; in addition
to evolving new forms of action and new remedies, legal services lawyers
have, through their work, had the secondary effect of bringing an
awareness of the problems of the poor to the law schools, to the legal
profession, and to the general public. Finally, these programs provide
a training ground for lawyers who then move on to other kinds of work
for the poor.
The shortcomings of the legal services programs as a way of dealing
with the problems of the poor have become increasingly apparent
over time.6 The ideal of service for all has led to extremely heavy
caseloads, with a necessary effect on the quality and comprehensiveness
of the representation given; the only realistic way to begin to cope
with the quantity problem is to push for increased standardization of
legal forms and procedures, and for greater use of lay people in
furnishing legal service. In addition, legal services programs may funda-
4. See Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1049-50 (1970).
5. Lawyers are provided both by the federal Economic Opportunity Act, 42 US.C.
§ 2701 et seq. (1964), and by private legal aid societies. See generally Tlze Availability of
Counsel and Group Legal Services: A Symposium, 12 U.C.L.A. L Rrv. 279 (1905); Caln
& Cahn, Implementing the Civilian Perspective-A Proposal for a Neighborhood Law
Firm, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964); CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: THE EXTENSION OF LEGAL SEE.
VICES TO THE POOR (Stats ed. 1964); Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in
Legal Services for the Poor, SO HARv. L. Rav. 805 (1967): Pye, The Role of Legal Services
in the Anti-Poverty Program, 31 LAW AND CoN-riap. Pron. 211 (1066); Symposium, Jus.-
tice and the Poor, 41 Nom DAZME LAWYER 843 (1966); S)ymposium, The war on Poverty,
Legal Services and the Rural Poor, 15 KAN. L. REV. 401 (197).
6. See, e.g., Hannon, Leadership Problems in the Legal Services Program, 4 LAw & Soc.
REv. 235 (1969).
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mentally misconceive the plight of the poor and the relation of the
law to that plight. A program focused upon services to individuals will
fail to deal with the legal and institutional sources of the grievances
of the poor. As Carol Ruth Silver says, "The legal problems of the
very poor.., tend to involve issues common to the entire economic
class; [the] class has a group interest in institutions and institutional
practices, in governmental policies, programs and laws."1 In the legal
services office, overwhelmed by individual cases, reform of laws and
institutions-reform that would affect the poor as a group and would
deal with the depressed state of their day-to-day existence-is neglected
in the rush of small, individual matters the office must handle. Mary
Beth Halloran of the Neighborhood Legal Services Project in Washing-
ton, D.C., admits that she "has no time for any long-range solutions."
While it may be true that the ready availability of legal services will
somewhat deter institutional offenders, and while, as Edgar Cahn
pointed out, the availability of legal services may be necessary to free
community people as well as lawyers to attend to larger matters, legal
services alone cannot further fundamental goals of the struggle to al-
leviate poverty. It does not contribute to substantial redistribution of
the country's economic resources; it affects income redistribution for
the class of poor people only by subsidizing the cost of legal services
provided.8 It does not redistribute political power in the society. And
it does not open new life possibilities for those who are born poor or
black.9
Most of these criticisms of the service approach to "legal problems"
facing poor people are not new. As the War on Poverty's Legal Ser-
vices Program was itself taking shape, shortcomings of the services ap-
proach were pointed out by those suggesting a different emphasis in
the federally-supported effort.10 The lawyers for the poor whom we
interviewed are all in some way attempting to meet perceived weak-
nesses in the legal service approach. One goal is to provide more creative
and comprehensive service to individual clients with specific legal dif-
7. Silver, Imminent Failure of Legal Service for the Poor: Why and How to Limit
Caseloads, 46 J. oF URBAN LAw 271, 218 (1968).
8. See, e.g., Hazard, Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. Ciu. L. R1v. 699, 707.09
(1969).
9. See, e.g., Cahn 9- Cahn, What Price justice: The Civilian Perspective RevisIted, 41
NOTRE DAME LAwYER 927, 941 (1966). They criticize those who treat "the demand
[of the poor] for justice under law" as "coextensive with the demand for legal services,
Other demands-for full citizenship, for opportunity, for participation-are trcated by
the legal profession as 'political demands.'"
10. Earl Johnson's forthcoming history of legal services discusses In detail the origin
and early days of the federally-sponsored program.
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ficulties. Jim Lorenz, a founder of California Rural Legal Assistance
(CRLA) and an alumnus of a large corporate law firm, relates this com-
prehensive service to that traditionally given by large firms:
The mere fact that the best private firms say "take as much time
as it takes to do a good job" is something extraordinary. You have
a lot of pressure in the legal aid business to help people. They
come into your office in horrible straits. To keep saying "No, I
will only take as many of you as I can represent on a quality
basis," was a pretty revolutionary attitude."1
Aside from more comprehensive service for specific clients, the
emphasis of most public interest lawyers is on having a wide impact
on the poor, usually through representing groups rather than individ-
uals and through attempting to achieve changes in legal rules and in
the behavior of governmental agencies. As Lorenz pointed out, there
may be a connection between comprehensive service and the quest for
"impact":
We found that cases other legal services groups were handling
were treadmill only because they were perfunctorily done. We
found that many of those cases had issues which were bigger issues.
One of the ways to find impact cases is to be thorough on the
cases you do handle. When you go into depth in the cases which
you handle, and maintain an ongoing relationship with groups
which are interested in broader issues, you tend to run across more
impact cases.
Since the search for greater impact depends in large part upon the
11. Lorenz adds:
The large corporate firm is involved with power. That is part of the business of
big firms. They represent powerful clients, and they build up a reputation of having
smart lawyers who do thorough legal work which can be relied upon by judges,
administrators and legislators. Having clients with power, they can resoh' things
short of going to court. Because many of their clients have enough money to employ
them on a continuing basis and to provide them with a good deal of work, they
can establish continuing relationships with the people who are involved in making
decisions in the society. Since they handle big, involved cases, they are more likely
to be handling "interesting" cases, and more able to recruit bright young law
students.
All of this is relevant if you are talking about setting up a quality legal services
organization concerned with the reallocation of power in society. Legal services
programs can only attain a small amount of the kind of power held by the large
corporate firms because the power of the legal services program's clients is, by
definition, limited. But legal services programs can maximize the bargaining power
which they are able to bring to bear on their clients' problems if they become in.
volved in big case litigation, administrative proceedings, and legislation, as well
as the routine day-to-day service work. In so doing, they can establish continuing
relationships with government officials and interest groups. They and their clients
would be able to plan ahead and take the initiative on some problems by filing
lawsuits, rather than always reacting to the issues raised against them. They could
offer interesting and compelling work to bright, committed lawyers.
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lawyer's assessment of how social change is best achieved in the United
States-and of what sort of change is most important-the lawyers we
interviewed have moved in many directions. The various roles which
they have assumed, including litigator, negotiator, policy researcher,
public relations man, and community organizer, suggest a much larger
conception of the lawyer's role than the old-fashioned legal aid lawyers
ever imagined.12 Despite frequent disagreement over strategies, and
sometimes over goals, the lawyers proved remarkably tolerant of the
work of other lawyers for the poor-reflecting, perhaps, their personal
doubts and uncertainties about what the right answers are for Amer-
ican society, and therefore what the lawyer's role and approach should
be.' 3
One approach to achieving large impact is through test cases, which
seek to establish wide-ranging legal principles or legal rules. Many
public interest lawyers, including those legal services organizations with
law reform units, use this approach. Some organizations concentrate
on test case litigation and often specialize in certain substantive areas.
12. In referring to those lawyers, Gary Bellow said, "There is a much narrower view
of what a lawyer does among the legal aid lawyers than there Is among private firm
lawyers."
13. The lawyers we interviewed exhibit a range of commitments to and alienation
from the American political and economic system; but for the most part, they are
committed to that system and hopeful that it will undertake the reforms necessary to
make this a decent society. Nevertheless many have found it impossible to live through
the past few years without developing a basic ambivalence about their work and their
commitments. For example, Marian Edelman, who plays the system's political game it
Washington, revealed her deep uncertainty about the utility of what she is doing:
I don't know what the answers are in this country. Hunger has taken threce
years and we are about where we started off-we are getting little reform, I am
beginning to understand a little about the cooptation of the system. I'm not sure
I'm right. My instinct is to keep at it, but I'm not sure whether the answer is inside
or outside the system. I'm beginning to think it's probably both. I know that If I had
grown up on the block with the Panther office in Chicago I would have been a
Panther in a week. In fact, if I had stayed in Mississippi I would be a very
different person.
Though I'm personally very pragmatic, I find it very hard to maintain real hope
about the capacity of this country to change. I just don't think people fundamentally
understand, or if they understand will give up the kinds of things that would have to
be given up to bring about the kind of change necessary. I will not say "you're
wrong" to people like Tom Hayden because I'm not convinced they are wrong.
I may not agree with their tactics, but I don't feel that I can judge them and say
they are wrong, particularly when my way is not always effective. While I won't
shoot somebody myself and while I don't think that the best way of operating Is
to go out in the streets with the Weathermen, I no longer feel so easy in condemn.
ing violence as a means of change in this country when I run up against the un-
responsiveness of institutions day after day in seeking change through peaceful
means.
Another lawyer commented that "it is wrong to assume a monolithic approach. We need
militants to make people more ready to deal with us, to make us more acce table.'
But he added, "No one is omniscient enough, or sufficiently in control, to say with ainy
certainty who is serving whose purposes.. . . You have to be careful about co.optatlon
if you are a legalist, which is basically my method of social reform. We have to acknowl.
edge that there are other ways of doing things."
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The Columbia Center on Social Welfare Policy Law focuses mainly
on state and federal public assistance programs. It has attempted to
coordinate its litigation with other lawyers in the country to produce a
national litigation strategy. The NAACP Inc. Fund brings test cases in
furtherance of a value, integration; these cases may have national
impact, as Brown v. Board of Education'- did, or may seek simply to
affect a single local school system. Test case law reform is a kind of in-
terest group politics which uses the court as a vehicle. The great ad-
vantage of test case litigation, of course, is that the appeal to legal
principles short-circuits the political process, where the interests of
unorganized poor or black people are rarely represented and often
disregarded.15
There are two main drawbacks to test case litigation. As Gary Bellow
put it:
The basic theory of test case litigation is that a court case can be
framed and directed toward the elimination of a particular wrong,
like maldistribution of income, and can be a vehicle for the elimin-
ination of injustice. For test case lawyers, the problem is merely
finding the particular rule or doctrine which embodies or causes
the injustice and challenging it. This approach is a dead end
for a number of reasons. First, it misconstrues the problem.
The problem of unjust laws is almost invariably a problem of
distribution of political and economic power; the rules merely
reflect a series of choices made in response to these distributions.
If a major goal of the unorganized poor is to redistribute power,
it is debatable whether judicial process is a very effective means
toward that end. This is particularly true of problems arising out
of disparities of wealth and income. There is generally not much
doctrinal judicial basis for adequately dealing with such problems,
and lawyers find themselves developing cases whose outcomes are
peripheral to the basic issues that these problems raise.
Secondly, "rule" change, without a political base to support it,
just doesn't produce any substantial result because rules are not
self-executing: they require an enforcement mechanism. California
has the best laws governing working conditions of farm laborers
in the United States. Under California law, workers are guaranteed
toilets in the fields, clear, cool drinking water, covered with wire-
mesh to keep flies away, regular rest periods, and a number of
other "protections." But when you drive into the San Joaquin
Valley, you'll find there are no toilets in field after field, and that
14. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US. 483 (1954).
15. See generally Howard, Adjudication Considered as a Process of Conflict Resolution:
A Variation on Separation of Powers, 18 J. pui. LAw 339 (1969); Vose, Litigation as a
Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 ANNALEs 20 (1958).
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the drinking water is neither cool, nor clean, nor covered. If it's
provided at all, the containers will be rusty and decrepit. It
doesn't matter that there's a law on the books. There's absolutely
no enforcement mechanism. Enforcement decisions are dominated
by a political structure which has no interest in prosecuting, dis-
ciplining or regulating the state's agricultural interests. It's non-
sense to devote all available lawyer resources to changing rules.
Recently, attorneys in Florida were fighting day and night to estab.
lish the same rules we have in California which are not enforced.
It's hard to admit it but it may well have been a waste of time.
These insights have a variety of consequences for the behavior of
lawyers. Some lawyers may simply believe that the courts are not the
best institutions to remedy social injustice. They therefore direct their
activities at legislatures, seeking new laws, or concentrate on govern-
ment bureaucracies, attempting to monitor the administration of laws
affecting the poor. This effort at law reform may be done by self-ap-
pointed lobbyists for the poor, but where political institutions are
involved, the existence of what Bellow calls a "political base" is ob-
viously even more important than it is in the test case area. The theory
is that legislatures will make new laws, and executives will enforce new
rules, where interest groups exist to exert continuing pressure 0 and
to participate in the coalition work that is the stuff of legislative
activity.'7 Thus, most of the lawyers we interviewed have moved toward
working with organized groups of poor people, working with orga-
nizers, and occasionally even organizing itself. Furthering the viability
of organized groups has an impact beyond the effort to achieve
new legislation; organizing and building a new set of coalitions
may take place without immediate reference to electoral politics."8
Where organized groups exist, pressures can be applied in any number
of ways on a whole range of institutions, public and private. Indeed,
new "community controlled" institutions can be created. Furthermore,
16. Jim Lorenz commented that the issue is not only a question of "participatlon" and
"representation" in the political process, but rather a question of power:
We've learned this the hard way. Last year, for example, we introduced model
landlord-tenant legislation before the California legislature and submitted forty
pages of well-reasoned, documented testimony on behalf of our tenant-clients. The
California Real Estate Association came into the hearing for three minutes, said
that it was opposed to the legislation, and the Assembly Housing Committee then
voted against us by a large margin-in part, because the Real Estate Association
gives money to their Assemblymen campaigns and remembers how they vote and
our dients don't.
17. For a comparison of the style of legislative work with that of traditional legal
services work, see Hazard, Law Reforming in the Anti-Poverty Effort, 87 U. Cit. L. REv.
242, 250-55 (1970).
18. See generally J. SKLomxc, THE PoLrrics oF PROTr (1969); M. HARRINGTON, To.
WVAR.D A DaasocnRAlc LEFT (1968).
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while test case law reform necessarily requires the constant participation
of middle class lawyers, organized poor people have power which they
can exercise themselves, and they need not be so dependent upon the
lawyer. Thus, test case law reform-the essential strategy of the un-
organized-becomes simply one tactic among many available to poor
people's groups.'9
A decision to go beyond test case litigation characterizes virtually
all the lawyers whom we interviewed. Some of those lawyers work
permanently in Washington to affect policy for the poor as it is made
by Congressional and agency decision-makers.20 They tend to have a
less intimate or at least less sustained relationship with organizations
19. Jim Lorenz, a founder of California Rural Legal Assistance, attempted to show
how test case litigation can relate to the new emphasis on working with organized groups,
suggesting that although in some situations test case litigation can undercut organizing
the two may be complementary:
Test case litigation (which I think really started with the Inc. Fund's Brown v.
Board) predated organizing in the civil rights movement (which really began with
Martin Luther King)-and there are very good reasons for this. In the early 1950's,
economic and political inequality was so memorialized by our laws and imple-
mented by our legal system that until blows were struck against this institutionalized
inequality, it was impossible to say to Southern Negroes that organizing was
possible. The Inc. Fund had to go to the courts first because the malapportioned
legislatures were stacked against the Blacks and the poor, because the administra-
tive agendes were pretty well dominated by the politiians and because the countrybelieved that laissez-faire domination of the powerful counted for more than
equality. Once the Equal Protection Clause came into play, once the federal courts
and then the federal government enlisted on the side of the underprivileged, oncethe laws (which, if nothing ore, are symbols of what the country rofeses to be-
lieve in) were changed, and most important, once the rural-dominated legislatures
were being reapportioned, it was possible to speak of Bl1ack Power. As power could
be exercised by the people themselves, less heed had to be p aid to middle class people,
indluding lawy'ers. The same process of development has happened all over again inthe War on Poverty and in legal services.
[Thus,] law reform is not necessarily antithetical to organizing. First, it is often the
first stage of organizing. Legal pressure can serve as a catalyst for political conscious-
ness and organizing; and if it is like a skin which the snake sheds at a later teayon,
it nonetheless serves a purpose for awhile. Second, test cases often prove comple-
mentary to the building of organizational power. For example, the w¢elfare residency
case [Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 6.18 (1969)] served to move welfare decison-
making away from the local level and help ed organizers like Gieorge Wiley [of thleNational Welfare g an o urights organizations at the tate
and federal levels. Law suits fled on behalf of organized groups can be very helpful ingiving the groups publicty, in allowing them to define issues more cearly, in
providing a bridge with middle class allies (who are willing to undertake cooperation,
if it is limited and defined, as law suits are), and in providing another weapon which
the organizations can utilize against non-friendly government asn.es, etc.
However, law reform can undercut organizing in a number of ways. When the
lawyer is a necessary player in the game, he may well end up in center stage, ith
the people he is representing relegatet to the background, unless he is very careful.
To the extent that reliance is based upon legal change trough the courts, wie are
essentially non-democratic institutions, th.e people may be less ready to mobile
themselves, either for pressure on partculr issues or for more conventional political
organizing. And insofar as lawyers are wrapped up in rule changes and are unso-
phisticated about economic realities, the basic eonomic nature of the problems can
be overlooked.20. Special issues, such as the battle to kill the Murphy Amendment, may bring
locally based lawyers to Washington temporarily.
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of the poor than do locally-based lawyers. Edgar Cahn's Citizens Ad-
vocate Center is a Washington-based operation designed to monitor
federal grant programs, such as food stamp, urban renewal, model cities,
and legal services. Thus the focus of attention is those federal agencies
charged with distributing funds to aid the poor. Cahn is in Washington
because that is where decisions are made: he is trying to change the
behavior of a centralized institution because he found that lawyers
based locally, working with local community groups, could not deal
adequately with the problems of federal grant-making. A controversy
over the refunding of a project in Mississippi led Cahn to believe that
"in order to avoid an ad hoc, crisis-approach to calls [by federal gran-
tees] for help and intervention, a new institution, prepared to respond
to complaints, and monitor the discretionary action of federal officials
was needed."21 Specific complaints from local groups are followed up
by investigation, and the Center also initiates its own studies of federal
programs.
The thrust behind Cahn's organization is complex: he is attempting
to represent groups, to change the way institutions behave, and, in some
sense, to organize. To the extent that he processes complaints he usually
is representing organized groups of poor people who seek federal grants;
in effect, then, one goal is to further the viability of community orga-
nizations of the poor, organizations which may engage in a variety of
activities on a local level. He is also attempting to create monitoring
mechanisms "so that federal agencies can begin to police their own
programs and respond effectively to complaints." Finally, his research
efforts-on issues such as hunger and the treatment of the American
Indians-are attempts to organize a wide coalition around these issues,
with an eye toward future changes in federal policy. It is important
to realize that Cahn is not an organizer in the sense of organizing
poor people. He wrote a report on American Indians,2 but did not
suggest that a group take over Alcatraz Island, did not participate in
occupying the Island, and has not become involved in the affairs of
various tribal councils-the Indians want to do this themselves. Cahn's
studies are aimed at organizing middle class people to provide assis-
tance to poor people on the terms poor people set.
Marian Wright Edelman, director of the Washington Research
Project, is another public interest lawyer whose goal is to affect federal
21. Cahn & Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARV. L. Rny. 929 (1968).
22. This study was published in 1969 under the title OuR BRoTMa's KrI'aEn: Tita
INDIAN IN WHrr AMEPRCA. A sharply critical review of Cahn's report and method of
study is Deloria, Book Review, 1 YALE Rnv. LAW & Soc. AcnoN 102 (1970).
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policy. Her short career spans much of what lawyers working for the
poor have done and are doing. After graduating from Yale Law School,
she worked in the NAACP Legal Defense Fund office in Jackson,
Mississippi. Her work at the outset was mainly litigation: suits to
integrate local public accommodations, to integrate local schools, and
to aid welfare recipients. But she soon joined the ranks of those ad-
vocates of the poor who found that changing rules can be a dead end.
"The thing I understood after six months there was that you could
file all the suits you wanted to, but unless you had a community base
you weren't going to get anywhere." Having come to this realization,
Edelman began to do much more organizing of blacks in Mississippi.
But she became convinced that fighting just on the local level was
"a drop in the bucket." This led her to move to Washington, and to
establish the Washington Research Project so that she could "con-
centrate on broader federal policy" in such areas as education, job
discrimination, and economic development. The weakness of existing
civil rights groups, she felt, was that they came to Washington once
a year and talked to the Secretary of Labor or of HEV; the groups
pushed for a big law once every three or four years, and forgot about
the legislation once it was passed. No one remained to watch when
agencies formulated crucial guidelines or were slow to enforce the
laws. Someone was needed in Washington "to run a monitoring opera-
tion at the federal level," to bring continuing pressure and skill to
bear on Congress and agencies affecting the poor, in particular poor
blacks in the rural South, whom she sees as her "constituency." When
she began, she expected to do only "negotiation, research, and reports
-no litigation." But changing federal policy turned out to be a slow
business, and the initial arsenal of weapons insufficient. Richard
Sobol, an experienced litigator and specialist on employment, was
hired so that the organization could pursue some of its more im-
mediate goals in court.
However, a major part of the work of the Washington Research
Project is research. The Project's most publicized effort thus far has
been its preparation, with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, of a
detailed critical report on implementation of Title I of the Aid to
Education Act. In discussing a new report the Project is preparing
on "health problems from the point of view of the patient," Edelman
indicated why research efforts are undertaken and how reports might
be used as the springboard for other efforts:
We aren't going to have just a strictly legal operation here.
I have always viewed the law as a tool to get other kinds of changes
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going. The health study and other studies that we do will hope-
fully provide the framework for picking out one or two key
issues around which to organize. One would, in addition, use
the entire study to badger HEW and other agencies involved
about their responses to the issues raised. I'm convinced that a
key organizing tool of the next ten years is going to be health.
It is one of the areas where money will be going from the federal
government and we can use it for economic development. We
have never thought of economic development centered around
federal programs, but health and education are the two areas
where there are going to be major expenditures. Health is going
to be one of the things you can organize around in terms of poor
blacks who are getting lousy services and middle-class whites who
are getting lousy services. Everybody's got the same problem, and
if you can somehow bring that out and get people to organize
in the health area, I think you've got a real thing going. One of
our obligations is to look forward to what kind of things you
can build new kinds of coalitions on.
Edelman's day-to-day work is dealing with federal agencies. Much
of the job is persistent overseeing of second and third level bureaucrats.
She describes the mechanics of being a Washington lawyer for the
poor:
What you really need to make anything move in Washington
is just sort of a pesty operation where you call up a guy and say
"What have you done?" or "What are you going to do?" or
"Here's what we want." Several kinds of things are important.
One is you just need persistence. Two, you need to know where
the decisions are made and how you can affect them. You create
a good internal network of information flowing out to you so
you know when a decision is being made before it is made so
that you can have an effect. What I wanted to do was try to get
an early-alert system. An example of how that works best is Ruby
Martin's role in monitoring school desegregation compliance.
Ruby was head of the civil rights compliance agency in HEW
under the Johnson administration, and for us she attempts to over-
see all pending administrative decisions on schools before they're
finalized. Take the Mitchell-Finch joint statement on school de-
segregation guidelines. When it finally came out everybody con-
strued it as a victory. We didn't. But in one sense it was-if you
had seen the many early drafts that said, in effect, that the guide-
lines were illegal and should have no effect. If Ruby hadn't had
good leaks within HEW and received the early drafts of the state-
ment so that we knew a guideline change was in process, and hadn't
had time to circulate it among allies and to the press, and to get
various Senators to call up Finch to ask, and have him deny, that
any change in the guidelines was coming, and hadn't built up
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pressure over a few weeks span, you would have had a much
worse statement on school desegregation than you did.2
What is most interesting about Edelman's conception is that even
though she spends most of her time seeking change in federal policy,
she remains deeply committed to the idea that "to take advantage
of any new change you get in Washington" it is necessary to have an
organized local community base:
Here we are, these nice bright lawyers going once a month to
HEW about regulations. That's not bringing about change. Our
big thing here is how can we get out in communities more and
how can we get an effective community network. One of the
things that has to be done is to build up a different constituency
on the left or at the bottom that is going to push these national
civil rights groups into more relevance, and you do that through
the poor communities. To have effective policy implementation,
you must have a mix of a sophisticated and informed press, good
administrative pressure, as well as good community information
and pressure. If we don't relate in all these ways, we might as
well go out of business, because decisions will not be affected.
Aside from seeing to it that decisions are enforced at the local level,
an organized and persistent political base is needed if a national lob-
bying effort on behalf of the poor is to be effective even in Washington.
To the extent that Edelman turns more to litigation-which short-
circuits the political process-she may be acknowledging that without
a political base, expertise employed to monitor political agencies
cannot have sufficient influence, at least where the interests of poor
people are involved. The poor must organize. To build the needed
community base, the Washington Research Project's broad policy
issue fights in Washington must be selected with an eye to what issues
can be organized around on the local level-"how you can take a
step that is going to give you something to build on over the years."
Organizing can only be effective where there are issues the community
really cares about.2 4 Thus, Edelman hopes to hire community people
23. Edelman feels that she can often get necessary information from vmrious admin-istrative agencies where Ralph Nader, with his more direct and aggressive approach,
meets greater resistance. A similar protective indirection informs her public relations.
To protect its information gathering and supply network, the Washington Research
Projects often leaks through others much of the information it uncovers. Edelman also
gives occasional background briefings to press people, and in return relies heavily upon
the press to supply her with information.
24. Edelman is convinced that "for two years in Mississippi when we were talking
about voting, we should have been talking about food, bemuse food was something that
people wanted."
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and lawyers who, using the Project's Title I report to frame issues,
can organize groups in Mississippi, groups that will gradually develop
the confidence to move on their own into other areas. In addition
to handling the broad policy issues, the Washington lawyers must
also respond to day-to-day complaints that come in from the local
communities asking for help: "You've got to keep in mind the relief
that people need at the local community level. You want to keep
their support." Furthermore, through the use of a newsletter, the
Project is attempting to develop a network of contacts with commu.
nity groups, and develop an information flow to them.
As Edelman indicates, there is a tension, both political and personal,
between on the one hand wanting to be where powerful governmental
decision-makers are, and on the other hand wanting to "stay local"
where those decisions may have their impact, where important local
changes can be made, and where organizing is actually done. Most of
the other lawyers we interviewed restrict their activities to working
with people from a single locality. A hybrid operation, reflecting some
of the tensions within the Washington operations already described,
is California Rural Legal Assistance. CRLA has numerous local "legal
services" offices throughout rural California and a central office in San
Francisco to coordinate major efforts. Many of the lawyers work ex-
tremely closely with organizers of the California Chicano community,
such as Cesar Chavez, and are adjuncts to an increasingly powerful
state-wide organization of Mexican-Americans. Thus, CRLA combines
legal service for individuals, law reform, and group representation.
Although 70% of its time is spent on day-to-day service cases, CRLA's
most publicized activity has been its suits against government agencies.
Jim Lorenz explained why he finds such suits particularly useful:
We are involved in, a great deal of litigation with government
agencies, in part because a large number of our clients rely on
entitlements from the government, such as welfare, social security,
and unemployment payments, which are often arbitrarily cut off
by the government. In addition, I suppose, we and our clients
like to attack social problems by suing the government because
we think the government is more susceptible to legal pressure and
to publicity than are private individuals or organizations. After
all, the government is supposed to have a duty to serve all of the
people, whereas most private organizations do not have such a
duty. Government bureaucrats are often afraid of controversy, of
notoriety, of anything which will disturb the security of their
anonymity in the large, all-protecting organization. Government
officials are bound by the freedom of information laws, which re-
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quire them to make public some of the information in the files,
whereas private individuals are not so bound. The government is
a better pressure point. By filing one lawsuit against the govern-
ment, we may be able to compel the government to take action
against 10,000 employers, whereas if we dealt with the employers
directly, we might have to file 10,000 lawsuits.
Lorenz added:
Our work has impact when the client groups which we represent
are perceived as having some political power, when the cases which
we handle for our clients succeed in arousing public sympathy for
those clients and indignation against our opponents, and when
the cases are supported by middle class groups, such as the trade
unions, which do have political power.
Although most of the locally based lawyers we interviewed do handle
cases for individuals, they tend increasingly to work with local groups
of poor people, either organized or in the process of organizing.
The Boston office of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law provides its clients quite traditional legal representation: it refers
most of its cases to private law firms. Representation, however, is ori-
ented toward organized groups. According to the head of the office,
Steven Rosenfeld:
Legal action seldom, if ever, exists in a political vacuum, and one's
success depends very greatly on one's political power. Part of what
defines political power is organization, the strength of the client's
organization. If a group of disorganized people came to me and
said, "We need help on rental increases," the first thing I might
suggest is that as presently organized, I just don't think you've got
the clout to turn them around short of litigation, and don't we
really want them to turn around short of litigation? Clearly the
most positive result is where you negotiate something above the
minimum that the law requires. I say, "What's your chance of
organizing. Why not use the discontent? If you have a meeting I
will be glad to come along and explain what the law says in this
area and what are some of the things we will have to do in order
to present an effective challenge. But it is as an organized group
that you have the greatest chance of making yourselves heard." If
I were to say go ahead, I don't think I would be a very good
lawyer. I don't think I would be recognizing as I should what it
takes to win legal battles. I think a legal challenge is only a very
small part of it.25
25. Note also the following passage from an artide by Ann Fagin Ginger:
I do believe that the law can be a tool for social change, but we must recognize its
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Rather than becoming a member of an organization of lawyers that
provides legal assistance to many groups and individuals, the lawyer
may choose to make a commitment to a single organization of poor
people. As a poor people's group grows in numbers, strength, and activ-
ity, there may be advantages in having a full-time lawyer, both because
a better integration of the organization's and the lawyer's activities is
possible and because the lawyer's exclusive commitment probably as-
sures a deeper loyalty to the group and greater trust by the group.
Stephen Wexler is, in effect, a house counsel to the National Welfare
Rights Organization.2 0 The job of lawyer in this strong, increasingly
well-organized group of welfare recipients-a national organization
with numerous locally-based chapters-includes test case litigation
and from time to time criminal defense work, but the lawyer works
closely with NWRO leaders and organizers, who do not depend on
the courts to provide all their victories.
Gary Bellow, co-founder of CRLA and now at the Western Center
on Law and Poverty, shares the assumptions about the importance of
organized groups of poor people, and self-consciously relates this to
the importance of working on the local level. Having largely abandoned
the hope that existing national governmental institutions are going to
create quick social justice, and in any case committed to building
independent, locally-based power units, Bellow is moderately critical
of the "nationally"-oriented lawyers:
The attorneys in Washington tend first to establish a firm, and
then focus upon developing a constituency. But constituencies
do not develop overnight, and institutional restructuring is a long,
tedious process. It may be that centralization of agencies of change
in Washington or anywhere, has, at this time, inhibitory rather
than productive effects. Too much power in one place too fast al-
lows little opportunity for organizations to compete, to grow, to
develop their own strategies and to learn from their own successes
and failures. All of us in this type of work tend to want to change
limitations. Law is an instrument for the exercise and the restraint of power and
defines power relationships. It does not determine who has the power. I do not
think that a strike is the same thing as a court argument, and a lawyer's spchcl to
the Fifth Circuit, even if he wins, is not the same as a sitdown strike in Flint or a
boycott in a Southern city. The two can be connected. When a lawyer talks to people
about their rights in a fundamental sense, he strengthens the individual client and
the organizational client to the point where they are prepared to do things they were
afraid to do before. Not that you should tell them what they should do and should
not do. But certainly they should know what the law says, and something about the
history of this society.
A.F. Ginger, The Movement and the Lawyer, 26 Gusw PRAcneiONER 12 (1967).
26. Mr. Wexler has written an article elsewhere in this issue of the Journal; Wexler,
Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YAx L.J. 1049 (1970).
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structure too fast. We are doing nationally in the public interest
law firms exactly what CRLA did in California. It moved so fast
that a number of institutional problems were created which might
have been avoided if there had been time to experiment, question
and retreat from previously taken positions.2 7
Bellow believes that his fundamental goal of bringing about a re-
distribution of power can best be served by the lawyer becoming in-
volved in organizing the poor. Sophisticated in using litigation to deal
with governmental institutions28 Bellow also suggests a unique way in
which litigation can be used as an organizing device:
If litigation is directed toward the different goal of organizing,
the potentials and methods in pursuing a law suit significantly
change. In such a context, law suits can consciously be brought for
the public discussion they generate, and for the express purpose of
influencing middle class and lower class perspectives on the prob-
lems they illuminate. They can be vehicles for setting in motion
other political processes and for building coalitions and alliances.
For example, a suit against a public agency may be far more im-
portant for the discovery of the agency's practices and records
which it affords than for the legal rule or court order it generates.
An effective political challenge to the agency may be impossible
without the type of detailed documentation that only systematic
discovery techniques can provide. It is on this base that coalitions
and publicity can be built, and that groups can be organized to
limit previously invisible authority. This, of course, suggests a
different orientation for the attorney interested in political change.
27. A similar social analysis, and similar assumptions about "the limitations of the
law," are expressed by "movement lawyer" Paul Harris of the San Francisco Commune.
In a paper presented at the national conference of the National Lawyer's Guild, held
earlier this year, he emphasizes somewhat more than Bellow the need for lavers to de-
velop "skills in the criminal law."
28. Bellow described his use of law suits against government agencies in the following
way:
Remember that in assisting group interests, the purpose of the organization is not
to change legal doctrines. That's the whole problem with the concept of law re-
form. That's lawyers' talk. The organization's purpose is to bring about some
change in the situation of its members and to establish some real modification of
problems they face. That may involve changing legal rules; it may not.
For example, a group of farm workers tells me that, in essence, they want the
disease and injury rates from pesticides to be reduced substantially. There exist
laws on the books; the agency does not, however, enforce these laws or enforces
them so selectively that enforcement has no effect on the practice. The problem is
the creation of a mechanism that can create a substantial and lasting change in
behavior, governmental and private. This is inevitably a political as iell as a legal
problem. We can try to generate pressures on the parties involed by bringing
public attention to the problem, or try to develop sanctions for non-compliance
with existing laws, or attempt to develop instituuonal mechanisms to keep the
problem visible. Sometimes we can achieve these results with a law suit. Sometimes
a legal decision can produce conforming behavior. But, what happens when we go
away-when the pressure abates? Legal victories can be so easily circumvented. If
one avenue is blocked, five other alternatives remain open.
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He will spend a great deal more time in political organizing, in work-
ing on cases and priorities that reflect the group demands of his
clients and in developing cases in a way which reinforces their
political integration and cohesion. Let me give you an example:
In Tulare County, I was involved in a law suit on behalf of a
Tenants' Union attempting to improve conditions in a farm labor
camp by withholding rent. I took a deposition from the head of
the Housing Authority which ran the camp-at a place where the
tenants could come and watch. I insisted that the deposition be
taken in front of those tenants so they could see me challenge him,
question him, and get information from him that they had pre-
viously been unable to obtain. They left with the sense that he
was not invulnerable and that they were not totally without lever-
age or protection. It helped them, I think, continue the fight. It
didn't matter that the case went on for two years, that the Sup-
reme Court denied certiorari on it and that we in fact lost the
legal issue. By the time the Supreme Court did rule, new housing
was being built for the residents of the camp, over $5,000 in money
had been returned to them in back rent, and a set of rules and
procedures had been agreed upon that would bar any kind of
retaliatory eviction actions in the future.
What we did there was to use the litigation for building the ten-
ant's organization. Had we focused solely on the legal issues and
on the litigation none of those tenants would be in that housing
today.
Consider another example: assume an attorney is seeking an in-
junction and he must make a decision as to the type of preliminary
relief he will ask of the court. What criteria should govern this
decision? An attorney focusing on political organizing might well
delineate the narrowest rather than the broadest ground in seek-
ing preliminary relief. For example, in a landlord-tenant dispute
he might seek a restraining order preventing the landlord from
using force or self-help. This is, of course, a clear legal right in
California, and the likelihood of obtaining such an order would be
high. Why would it be sought? Twenty tenants would go in with
the attorney to court asking that they not be thrown out by the
landlord before he goes to court. And they'd walk out with a paper
in their hands restricting the landlord's power. More than the
protection, they'd have won a victory. They can go back to the
forty other tenants who didn't go to court and say "We won our
first fight. Now we'll try a harder fight."
Another perspective on working with local groups of poor people
was suggested by John Flym:
The only hopeful solution is to return decision-making power to
people generally, and that can only be done by decentralization.
That doesn't necessarily mean a simple concept of decentraliza-
tion. We can have political units of various sizes but I think the
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vast majority of decisions can be made in very, very small units,
on what the individual really thinks is important. Then you stim-
ulate these individuals to take responsibility for decisions; it
stimulates the imagination.
I do have a sense that the ghettoes particularly have tremendous
potential for renovation. They are pools of real life; the suburbs
are almost dead by comparison. There tends to be concentrated
culture and experience in the ghetto which seems to me to be
necessary for people in those communities to make the most out of
the precious resources that they have available. By breaking down
geographical units into small political units, I mean really taking
things very much as they are now .... I have a sense that probably
people could improve their own lives in a fantastic way, given
existing resources. I base that in part on the fact that other people
in other countries do manage to lead beautiful lives. .. . The
quality of their lives is very substantial in circumstances that are
basically very bad. Here we tend to compare the worst off and the
best off people and judge by standards that are really very artificial.
What makes life hard here is the institutional organization of life-
all of the things which do not necessarily make things big but
which destroy the small units, so you end up with no community
as such.... Those things depend much less on substituting one
set of structures and institutions for others than they do on getting
the ball rolling and doing it yourself and getting your friends and
neighbors where you happen to find yourself to start doing things.
Stimulate a process where you say to people, "Look, we are not
talking big. We're talking about you having power, not big power,
but power over your lives and the institutions that affect your life
right around you."
Concepts of community participation and control are central to Jean
Cahn's work at the Urban Law Institute. Perhaps more interested in
creating institutions than Flym, many of whose clients are personal
friends, Mrs. Cahn works only with community groups. Most clients
are local Washington, D.C., groups-tenant organizations, co-ops, small
corporations, etc. The Institute helps these groups in such matters as
funding, writing by-laws, and incorporation. Mrs. Cahn is intimately
involved in the organizing of groups as well, and her emphasis is on
developing institutions which embody the ideal of community par-
ticipation. Thus, she attempts to set up cooperative food stores, co-
operative housing developments, community-run hospitals, and com-
munity-run child care facilities. Establishing local institutions does
not itself bring about major reallocations of national wealth or power.
But new local institutions can keep resources from fleeing the ghetto,
and can help create new resources. In addition to working for specific
local groups, the Institute is drawing up blueprint "models" for other
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groups around the country who want to apply the Institute's successful
trial runs. Thus, the model on "tenants' organizations" discusses such
problems as how to organize a group, how to bring the group from
rent strikes to buying and managing its own property, and how to in-
corporate and draft by-laws. Other models either completed or in prog-
ress are an "economic development" model (how to finance projects
through the Small Business Administration and other programs for
black ownership), a "co-op" model (how to organize a co-op and get
members, how much capital is needed, difficulties generally encoun-
tered), a "Model Cities" model (for community groups involved with
Model Cities planning and administration), and a "public housing"
model (how tenants and others can deal with FHA). Some of these
models are aimed at lawyers, and others, at those who want to organize
the community groups themselves. The models could be used to start
national, but locally-based, movements: a tenants' union movement,
a federal housing rights movement, a co-op movement, etc. As inner-
city residents become mobilized and organized around similar local insti-
tutions, there is potential for a cumulative effect, for the creation of a
new national movement or lobbying force.
It is still unclear how successful the various efforts at organizing will
be, or what will be the lawyer's role in such efforts. Organizing can
be very difficult and very discouraging, especially where people are
exhausted by their efforts to eke out an existence, and where they are
used to struggling for survival against each other rather than working
in groups to raise general standards. Building a strong and continuing
tenants' organization is harder than winning a single fight. An organiza-
tion may not be able to win the victories necessary to keep it going or to
achieve visible change. Other interest groups, firmly entrenched
in the decision-making process, may limit the successes of poor people's
organizations, whether those organizations are national or local. Sup.
porters of the pluralist system argue that social problem-solving is best
achieved by a process of mutual adjustment among competing inter-
ests. But the constant pressure to compromise may lead to incremental,
piecemeal solutions or approaches to problems; for the poor, the in.
crementalism that follows from the process of interest group mobil-
ization may not be sufficient.D
Furthermore, as the lawyer becomes more intimately involved with
growing organizations of poor people his own role becomes increasingly
problematic, especially if he is white with a middle class background.
29. See generally C. LiNDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCPACY (1965).
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The lavyer's most effective role in organizing is probably not to
go into a poor community and says to some people, "Hey, let's
form an organization," or to serve as a policymaker in an organi-
zation that is forming. The preferred and increasingly common role,
as Jim Lorenz said, is one in which "the lawyer works closely with an
organizer or with a group which is organizing itself, and provides legal
advice consistent with their wishes." Thus, the lawyer works with an
organizer of the poor, but is not himself an organizer--except in the
specific sense Lorenz pointed to: "White middle class lawvyers can't
effectively organize poor people; they can only organize for poor people,
by organizing their own middle class communities."
This outlook in part answers the question of what special skills the
lawyer has to become involved with organizing the poor. To a signif-
icant extent, as Bellow's approach to organizing suggests, the lawyer
is using traditional techniques and skills-for example, litigation-to
help the organizers do the job of organizing. But Bellow also realizes
that the use he suggests for litigation is based on a new self-conception
for the lawyer, and inevitably will require lawyers to be specially
trained to work with and serve poor people. There are, after all, signif-
icant dangers when middle class lawyers get intimately involved in the
task of organizing the poor.30 More articulate, better educated, aggres-
sive by nature and training, some lawyers tend to dominate newly
formed groups, even when they try not to; such dominance, even if the
middle class lawyer has been able to internalize the perspective of the
poor, will generally result in the same dependence on the lawyer which
a strategy of test case litigation inevitably means for the poor. The
organization will not develop the aggressive and self-confident indig-
enous leadership that is probably the most effective stimulus to a
vigorous membership, and the only lasting basis for the organization's
power.
B. Lawyers for Political and Cultural Dissidents
A number of public interest lawyers and law firms concentrate their
practice upon representing political and cultural dissidents, such as
student activists, underground publishers, and militant political orga-
nizations. Many so-called "political lawvyers" are also lawyers for poor
people, who are themselves in many senses "political dissidents"; in
addition, groups such as SDS and the Black Panthers, who are frequent
50. For a more general discussion of the lawyer's relationship with his clients, ree
pp. 1119-37 infra.
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clients of "political lawyers," are centrally concerned with the problems
of the poor. It is only because such radical groups have a wide-ranging
political and cultural critique of American society, because their con-
tacts with the legal order are significantly different from those of the
poor people's groups already discussed, and because their lawyers
tend to have a wide-ranging political practice, that those lawyers are
treated separately in this discussion.
Traditional civil liberties lawyers, such as those who work for the
AGLU,31 represent political, religious, and cultural dissenters of all
types, from the far right to the far left. As Melvin Wulf, Director of
the AGLU, put it, "Our real client is the Bill of Rights." For a number
of decades, the ACLU has been a courageous and lonely advocate for
unpopular clients. Its efforts, and those of other civil libertarian law-
yers, have been devoted to furthering the values of free speech, belief,
and association, regardless of the particular aims of individual clients.82
In contrast to the traditional civil libertarian, some political lawyers
dedicate their efforts only to political and cultural dissenters with
whom they are in sympathy.33 Thus, where speech is concerned, they
will accept as clients only those people with whose political position
they agree. For example, William Kunstler was recently asked if he
would use the arguments with which he defended Panthers to defend
Minutemen. He replied, "No, I wouldn't defend them at all. I only
defend those whose goals I share. I'm not a lawyer for hire. I only
defend those I love."8 4
While the AGLU lawyer is typically a litigator in the civil liberties
field, these other political lawyers often engage in a wider range of
activities.35 In addition, while the ACLU usually represents individuals,
31. For a description and evaluation of the ACLU and other civil libertles. organiza.
tions as they existed twenty-two years ago, see Comment, Private Attorneys-General:
Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 YALE L.J. 574 (1948).
32. The National Lawyers Guild, which now calls itself "a bar association and it
political organization," has a more explicit political orientation, to the left of the ACLU.
Unlike the ACLU, the Guild does not itself handle cases. For a discussion of the history
of and recent changes in the National Lawyers Guild, see Cloke, The National Lawyers
Guild, 1 RADICALS IN THE PROFESSIONS 1 (Feb. 1968).
83. See Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in CRITIQUE OF PURE ToLE.ANCE 81-117 (1935),
for theoretical treatment of the repressive function of tolerance for the Left and the
Right.
34. Quoted in Navasky, Right On! With Lawyer William Kunstler, N.Y. Tmes,
April 19, 1970, at 91 (magazine).
35. These "new" political lawyers have often been called "Movement Lawyers,"
because their clients are seen to be part of a movement in the country for basic social
change. Ann Ginger considers the component parts of the Movement to be a peace
movement, a student movement, a movement of the poor, and a movement of racial
minorities and immigrants. Ginger, supra note 25, at 12. In some sense, then, most of
the lawyers interviewed are Movement Lawyers. The relevant distinctions between
lawyers-their assumptions, the nature of their clients, their relationship with their
clients, and their life style-are considered in the text.
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the "new" political lawyer, like the lawyer for the poor, tends to
emphasize organized groups. His relationship to those groups may take
a number of forms, combining organizing, offensive representation,
and criminal defense work. Ongoing contact with the groups is com-
mon. George Johnson of New Haven, for example, handles draft and
drug cases as well as criminal defense work, but is also a lawyer and
organizer for the American Independent Movement, a minority party
active in New Haven politics. John Flym, of Flym, Zalkind and Silver-
glate in Boston, emphasizes a somewhat different role for a lawyer
committed to social change. Although he usually represents indi-
viduals (often students with such "hassles" as draft and drug prob-
lems) and "underground" organizations (such as Sergeant Ground's
Memorial Necktie, a coffeehouse), much of his time is spent in a slow
process of organizing the people he lives among. Convinced that im-
portant changes happen on a small scale, and convinced that "there
is not a hell of a lot that you can do through law in the way of fostering
change," Flym is also attempting to change individuals' consciousness:
You can try insofar as you can to build an awareness about what
you know best, among people that you understand best. What I
would like to do is stimulate a process, build a community where
people relate to each other in meaningful ways. As a lawyer, and
a recent law student-5-6 years away now, but I'm not that far
away and I am among student groups all the time-I know and
understand law and students better than anything else. This is my
constituency, if you will. I'm anxious to talk about the legal system
and legal education and foster consciousness about that. I think
the whole system is just hopeless and we've got to do something
about it. One thing an individual lawyer can do is talk about
what part the legal system plays in all of this.30
Where the political lawyers represent groups, those groups tend to
be "radical" in the sense that they are committed to fundamental
change in the structure of American society. The groups may not have
a commitment to the theory of pluralism and interest group politics,
or a faith that the existing legal system, with some reform, can achieve
a just society. For these political and cultural dissidents, to a greater
extent than for the groups usually served by legal services, legal insti-
tutions do not provide the primary focus for affirmative activity, and
56. It should be noted that where a middle class lawyer "organizes" by talking about
law to children of the middle class, there are likely to be fewer dangers than ucre
discussed above in connection with middle class lawyers' organizing poor or black
people. See pp. 1090-91 suPra.
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the practice of their lawyers reflects this difference.a3 Indeed, wary of
any activity that confirms or maintains "the system," some radical
lawyers are hostile to the work done by "public interest lawyers"; such
work is counterproductive, in their view, for while it can make the sys-
tem slightly less oppressive, it defuses efforts for more radical change.
Nevertheless, in one sense the lawyer for political groups shares the
thrust of the lawyer for the poor: his goal is to further the viability of
definable groups of people.
While this may entail servicing various legal needs of the group, and
even some organizing, the most important activity of lawyers for groups
such as SDS or the Black Panthers is criminal defense work. Although
criminal defense work is obviously needed to keep movement groups
alive, movement lawyers are at least ambivalent about the legal system,
and are endlessly troubled by whether their work aids or is in fact
counterproductive to radical efforts. One lawyer recounted a story told
by Victor Rabinowitz at a National Lawyers Guild conference. Rabin-
owitz was handling a case involving GI's who had gotten in trouble
for operating a coffeehouse at Fort Dix. The coffeehouse matter was
highly publicized and had become the focus of GI discontent at the
base, and of efforts to organize that discontent. Rabinowitz won the
case, and afterwards asked someone who had been organizing GI's
whether winning the case had been helpful to the organizing efforts.
On the contrary, the organizer said. Because the case was won, the GI's
tended to feel that they could rely on the courts, and that there was
no need to get involved with the riskier business of organizing.
One of the most enterprising and well-known of the political law firms
is Lefcourt, Garfinkle, Grain, Cohn, Sandler, Lefcourt, Karft 9C Stolar of
New York City. Frequently called the Law Commune, this firm special-
izes in criminal defense work, and is counsel in such cases as the "Pan-
ther 21" conspiracy trial in New York. While the lawyers in the firm
admit to having different political views, they all see themselves as
socialists and are careful to distinguish themselves from most of the
other lawyers we interviewed. The Commune selects political (usually
non-paying) cases on the basis of whether "the aims, political or other-
wise, of the group are towards wresting government power into the
hands of the people." But while all the Commune's clients are "anti-
Establishment," and while the Commune will accept political cases
87. See, e.g., Harris, You Don't Have to Love The Law to be A Lawyer, 28 GUILD
PRACrITIONER 97 (Fall, 1969). Of course, not all lawyers for the poor and racial minorltlcl
focus on legal institutions in an "affirmative" way. See generally, pp. 1087-89 supra.
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only where there is a "basic agreement" with the group, "there can be
areas of disagreement." "Yippies are elitist," Commune lawyer Ann
Garfinkle says, "but I take them." 38
In contrast to their sense of the need for wide-ranging social change,
the Commune lawyers have a narrow conception of their own role in
achieving that change. As Ann Garfinkle said:
Our job is to service people in the movement. Law is used two
ways to service the movement: to keep people on the street through
criminal defense work, and occasionally through offensive use of
the law where it can be used civilly. Movement people need the
help of lawyers in order to do organizing they, the movement
people, want to do. I organize lawyers, not other people. It would
be presumptuous to do otherwise.
Most of the Commune's work, then, is criminal defense work for
political radicals. Because the topic has been so much debated recently,
a special word should be said about the so-called "political trial." Today
the phrase usually applies to criminal prosecutions of such "enemies of
the realm" as radical political groups and draft resisters. From the
defense lawyer's point of view, a number of different conceptions are
involved. A political trial may be characterized simply by the fact that
public opinion and public attitudes on one or more social questions
will inevitably have an effect on the decision. In this sense, a political
trial is one where the defense lawyer seeks to get an acquittal by meeting
the implicit political issues head-on. Thus, where the defendant is
part of a mass arrest of anti-war demonstrators or campus activists,
public attitudes on the war or student movements are inevitably pres-
ent in the courtroom; the defense lawyer may choose to meet these
attitudes directly, to present his client's political beliefs explicitly, and
to make political arguments as much a part of the "defense" as any
other alibi.39
Furthermore, the trial may itself be used as an organizing device.
The trial becomes a propaganda vehicle for the defendants, and hence
a method for the group to bring its grievances and its program to the
general public. Political issues and differences are raised in the court-
38. To explain how they determine whether a case is "political" or not. Ann Gar-
finkle invoked the "Maggot Test," as explained by Arthur Kinoy and related by Abbie
Hoffman in his book Woodstock Nation. In brief, the test notes that the only percep-
tion which all of the sailors on the ship Potemkin shared was that conditions were so
abysmal that the food was infested with maggots. That dared perception stimulated
the revolt which triggered the Russian Revolution. The Commune, then, treats as po-
litical any case involving people who can see the maggots.
39. See generally 0. KiRCHHEIMER, PoLITICAL JUSTICE (1961); Malcolm Burnstein,
Trying a Political Case, 28 Guumn PRAcrmoNER 33 (Spring, 1969).
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room and aired in the press. The goal may be to affect the outcome
of the trial, but it may be more general. To a greater or lesser extent,
these defendants do not have faith that the American legal system will
or can grant them a just trial. In some cases defendants in political
trials, and occasionally their lawyer, have engaged in disorderly tactics;
these may be a response to specific perceived injustices in the handling
of the trial, or may be provocative acts to draw the judge into an over-
reaction, which can then be pointed to as further evidence of the im-
possibility of achieving a just trial. In many senses, the trial becomes a
play about itself: the issue of justice for the defendants is united with
issues of social justice, and the trial is conducted in such a way as to
illustrate the impossibility of either in American society. The tension
for the lawyer is obvious. To conduct a trial in this "political" way is to
complicate the task of securing an acquittal, which goal neither he nor
his clients entirely abandon. However, the defendants see the trial as
part of a wider political struggle, and an opportunity to bring their
larger case to the public and to expose inequities in the legal system.
C. Value-Oriented Public Interest Lawyers
The attempt to represent consumer and environmental interests
poses somewhat different problems for the public interest lawyer.
Unlike lawyers who deal with the concerns of the poor or political
dissidents, which often approach the level of immediate survival and
are therefore very intense, the consumer or environmental lawyer deals
with diffuse and, to any individual, less pressing interests held in com-
mon by all people. The vigorous labor union member is unlikely,
despite his disgruntlement at the quality of the appliances he purchases,
to join a consumer union. A partial explanation for his behavior is that
the goals of consumer organizations, such as fair labeling and product
safety, are "public goods"; that is, the labor union member knows that
he cannot be denied the benefit of fair labeling even though he did
not participate in securing it.
Just as there is a trend among poverty lawyers toward building po-
litical communities of the poor, so too is there a movement among
environmental and consumer lawyers to build economically and po-
litically powerful coalitions around a particular value or "secondary"
interest. But there is an important difference between the organizing
activities of poverty lawyers and those of consumer or environmental
lawyers. The goal of the former is the enfranchisement of a relatively
distinct minority; achievement of this goal involves primarily the
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development of group consciousness, internal leadership and orga-
nization, and political sophistication. Consumers, on the other hand,
do not constitute an identifiable and politically underrepresented class.
The problem is not disenfranchisement, but diffusion of power and
the low visibility of corporate and regulatory agency decisions affecting
the quality of American life. The primary effort in building coalitions
around consumer or environmental values, therefore, is to arouse and
mobilize the latent power of a potential majority. °
The most straightforward method of increasing public awareness-
the simple dissemination of information about substantive issues-is
not a preserve of lawyers alone, as is evident from a brief look at the
activities of environmentalist lawyers and laymen. The conservation
movement in America has a long history, yet its character has changed
dramatically in recent years. The change is well illustrated by the
circumstances surrounding the formation of the Friends of the Earth
Society, a group of ecology-minded professionals who emphasize
education through publication. Friends of the Earth grew out of a
split within the Sierra Club. Under the direction of David Brower,
the Sierra Club had developed from a "professional hiking orga-
nization" with 5000 members into a radical environmental group of
80,000. Brower began to publish expensive books designed to give a
vicarious wilderness experience. Additionally, the Sierra Club pub-
lished a series of books about areas in danger, including one that helped
to arouse popular support for saving the Grand Canyon. But Brower's
activities led to policy disagreements within the Club, and lie was
ousted in 1969.
In response, Brower formed Friends of the Earth to carry on the
activities he had pursued in the Sierra Club. It has already signed a
$13 million publishing agreement with McCall's magazine for an in-
ternational series and a scientific series on ecology. Although its lawyers
40. Edgar and Jean Cahn, in an article elsewhere in this Journal, maintain that the
"majoritarian, middle-class, white concerns" of environmental protection as a t)pe to
which the political process can respond adequately "without siphoning off limited, spedal
and constitutionally distinctive resources of the legal profession." Cahn & Cahn,
Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public Interest in Public Interest Law,
79 YAiL L.J. 1005 (1970). The coalition-building work needed to attack the problems
of pollution is different in kind from the efforts needed to meet the pressing needs of
disenfranchised minorities; the latter necessarily require the 'unique skills" of lawyers,
while "other avenues of redress are clearly open" for environmentalists. The Cahns
conclude: "At a time when the political s)stem has become less responsive, if not
outright hostile, to the grievances of ethnic minorities, the only profession spedally
protected in an advocacy role cannot justify its dereliction by regrouping under the
righteous banner of essentially majoritarian concerns." Id. at 1044.
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will resort to the courts where necessary, Friends of the Earth will
function primarily as an issue-oriented public relations firm, in the
business of educating the public about ecology.
Marshall Patner, of the Chicago firm of Patner & Karaganis, feels
that part of his function is to satisfy the demands of the press for com-
mentary on developments in the law. Beyond this, he described another
method of direct public education which utilizes the firm's five-mem-
ber investigative staff. At the firm's suggestion, a group called SAIL
(Stop the Airport In the Lake) published a full-page cartoon advertise-
ment in the Chicago Sun-Times to highlight the safety and environ-
mental reasons against building an airport in Lake Michigan. 41 Another
effective advertisement, entitled "Happy Cleaner Air Week to Mayor
Daley and His Friends,"42 was placed for the Campaign Against
Environmental Violence. Patner indicated that the firm is now con-
sidering whether to allot its time to personal appearances before local
groups and at teach-ins or to give top priority to preparing a pollution
handbook to assist community groups by laying out the relevant laws
and pinpointing the responsibilities of governmental officials. The
handbook would have a section on strategy analyzing the reasons for
success or failure of past environmental campaigns.
Yet another variant of the public education approach is employed
by the Conservation Law Foundation, a Boston-based organization of
New England lawyers and laymen. Under Executive Director Benjamin
Nason, the Foundation's primary endeavor has been to encourage and
assist community groups to implement wetlands and open space legisla.
tion, by explaining complex statutes and preparing the necessary legal
documents. Recently the Foundation financed the reprinting and dis-
tribution of a comprehensive study of municipal powers, Open Space
and Recreation: Program for Metropolitan Boston.
Corporate and governmental disregard for consumer and environ.
mental values stems not only from the lack of public awareness of the
problems, but also from a lack of public access to the decision-making
process. The corporations are so large and powerful that an individual
consumer or shareholder cannot expect to have any influence upon
their decisions. Regulatory agencies such as the Federal Power Com-
mission or the Federal Trade Commission, in theory the advocates of
"the public interest," are both relatively insulated from the political
41. Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 6, 1970, at 36 (advertisement entitled "Don't Do It In
The Lake").
42. Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 20, 1969, at 67.
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process and relatively immune, because of their own structures and
procedures, from significant inputs by consumers. A second thrust of
legal activity in this field of public interest law is, therefore, to bring
pressure upon corporations and agencies to make their decisions and
their processes more responsive to the interests in product and environ-
mental quality. This tactic is, of course, interrelated with the goal of
increasing public awareness; without the support of a vocal public,
lawyers can have little impact upon corporations, agencies, or Congress.
One technique of consumer advocacy is lobbying in Congress and
state legislatures. While the most effective impact upon legislatures no
doubt comes from the Ralph Nader-type exposure of corporate abuses
and agency dereliction 4 3 increasing pressure by lawyers on behalf of
organized consumer or environmental groups is being brought in less
visible ways. The Washington firm of Berlin, Roisman & Kessler re-
cently represented the Consumer Federation of America in opposing
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. The drafting of the Code illus-
trates the lack of consumer participation in the legislative process.
According to Anthony Roisman.
Consumers had not really been permitted to participate in draw-
ing [the Code]. There was an advisory committee, which had some
consumers on it, but they were not permitted to vote. The people
we felt best represented the consumer movement weren't involved
at all. We spearheaded the drive by the Consumer Federation of
America to stop it.
For the same client, the firm is presently lobbying in Congress for
legislation to facilitate consumer class actions.
Another recent effort by Berlin, Roisman & Kessler illustrates the
use of regulatory agency procedures to obtain relief for a particular
client, to seek broader change in agency rules, and to bring to public
and Congressional attention the need for changes in the law affecting
environmental regulation. Although the firm was retained by an
elderly couple to oppose the placement of power lines across property
situated along the Potomac River, the case developed into a full-blown
Congressional hearing in an effort to make the Federal Power Com-
mission establish general criteria for power lines. What had been a low-
visibility decision affecting only a few property owners became a public
hearing where the lawyers could raise general issues concerning the
effect of power lines on scenic beauty.
45. See pp. 1103-05 infra for an extended discussion of Nader's activities.
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Litigation is also a primary tool for lawyers who seek to further
values of consumer and environmental protection. Litigation may be
used as an adjunct to the pursuit of change through legislatures or
agencies; for example, a preliminary injunction obtained by Victor
Yannacone, Jr., prevented the destruction of unique fossil beds in
Colorado pending action by the United States House of Represen-
tatives upon a Senate-approved bill to declare the area a National
Monument. The courts may also be used to review the actions of regu-
latory agencies,44 or to force those agencies to act where they have
resisted pressure from consumer or environmental groups. The Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, for example, recently succeeded in obtaining,
from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, a vacation of
orders of the Secretaries of Agriculture and HEV concerning the use
of DDT.45 EDF's approach to environmental protection illustrates an
effective use of litigation as a primary tool.4 0 The twelve-man Board of
Trustees attempts to limit its efforts to matters where there is a broad
scientific consensus on the merits, a likelihood that the problems can
be attacked through a few carefully chosen lawsuits, and a significant
chance of setting a beneficial precedent. 47
The utility of constitutional litigation to achieve new principles of
legal entitlement is a subject of intense debate among consumer and
environmental lawyers as well as law school academics. 48 Constitutional
litigation may be seen in part as a substitute for the political process,
and thus any judgment as to its proper use will depend upon one's
evaluation of the responsiveness of political institutions as well as of the
inherent limitations of the judiciary. Victor Yannacone, Jr., who
frequently calls upon courts to use their equity powers to vindicate
what he asserts to be the public's constitutional right to a clean
environment under the Ninth Amendment, charges that agencies and
legislatures, dominated by special interest groups, simply do not pro-
tect environmental values.49
44. On the difficulties of obtaining effective judicial review, see Sive, Some Thoughts
of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. rv.
612 (1970).
45. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, No. 23, 813 (D.C. Cir., May 28,
1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Finch (D.C. Cir., May 28, 1970). E, D. Vt.
was represented in these actions by lawyers from Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, and the
Center for Law and Social Policy.
46. "The judiciary is the one social institution already structured to provide the
wise responses that may enable us to avert ecological disaster." Environmental Defense
Fund, Incorporated, descriptive pamphlet at 5 (1970).
47. Environmental Defense Fund, Incorporated, descriptive pamphlet at 13 (1970).
48. See generally A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROCarss (1970).
49. But Yannacone recognizes the political context of environmental litigation, Ile
brings class actions where possible to emphasize the public nature of the rights that he
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Either you seek to enter the political arena and secure passage of
legislation offensive to the least number of voters or other mem-
bers of the power structure, or you enter the courthouse and take
action to prevent further environmental degradation and to com-
pel restoration of the quality of the environment consistent with
the state-of-the-art.5o
In contrast to Yannacone, Professor Joseph Sax of the University of
Michigan, a behind-the-scenes consultant for many environmental
lawyers, believes that ultimate authority should reside in legislatures
energized to environmental questions rather than in a constitutional
mandate administered by the courts. While courts can sharpen issues
and handle relatively complex matters, Sax is "deeply troubled by care-
less, ill-prepared, and premature litigation which can destroy the
credibility of the effort to promote intelligent use of the courts."5al
In evaluating the different approaches to the use of courts to achieve
broad social change, it may be helpful to distinguish matters such as
environmental protection, which involve interests common to the
entire population, from matters involving the legal entitlement of
minority groups. While in the former case the political process is ade-
quate, once the public is aroused, to respond to real needs, in the latter
case the courts may be the only institution through which minorities
can vindicate fundamental rights neglected by a self-serving majority.
The use of litigation by public interest lawyers is not limited to the
pursuit of judicial remedies or court-made doctrinal reform. Yanna-
cone points out that constitutional litigation, even where unsuccessful
in the courts, may stimulate the legislature to action.52 His own con-
sciously dramatic claims and flamboyant style attract sufficient press
coverage to increase popular awareness of the issues raised by his law-
suits. The use of judicial review to focus popular attention upon an
issue is also recognized by Professor Sax, who suggests that when
formerly low-visibility decisions are remanded to legislatures or agen-
cies, they will then be made in the context of a popular awareness gen-
erated by the lawsuit, thus promoting "equality of political power for
asserts. From his perspective, the ideal plaintiff is a federation of local civic organiza.
tions; he suggests that this approach introduces a rough sort of practical democracy
unattainable in legislatures.
50. Yannacone, A Lawyer Answers the Technocrats, 5 TRIAL, AugustjSeptcmber 1969,
at 14, 15.
51. Sax, The Search for Environmental Quality: Tie Role of the Courts, in Tuz
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 99, 113 (1970).
52. "All the major social changes which have made America a finer place to live have
their basis in fundamental constitutional litigation. Somebody had to sue somebody
before the legislature took long overdue action." Quoted in Rogin, All He Wants To
Save Is The World, Snoars Im.usinAr, Feb. 3, 1969. at 24.
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a disorganized and diffuse majority."53 David Sive, President of the
Atlantic Chapter of the Sierra Club, whose efforts to stop the Hudson
River Expressway have thus far been successful, remarked: "A lawsuit
is a dramatic political instrument, much like a proxy fight." But Sive
adds a caveat: "While it is a legitimate instrument for promoting
progress, the lawyer must take care that he is not abusing the judicial
process."
While some lawyers in the consumer and environmental area have
used litigation and public education to attack particular actions of
corporations and agencies, other efforts have been aimed more gen-
erally at changing the decision-making processes of those institutions.
With regard to corporations, a frontal attack has been mounted by the
Project on Corporate Responsibility, a recently-formed group of four
young Washington lawyers. Philip Moore joined the Project after ex-
perience in a corporate law firm, the McCarthy campaign, the ACLU
convention litigation project, and a brief stint with Patner 8C Kara.
ganis in Chicago. On the assumption that "corporations make all the
decisions in this country," Moore sees the Project as an effort to open
up the corporate decision-making process to public influence and par-
ticipation.
The Campaign to Make General Motors Responsible, the first major
undertaking of the Project, centered on a proxy contest to secure adop-
tion by the corporation of several resolutions and amendments to its
bylaws. 4 General Motors was selected as a target, according to Moore,
because of its "enormous size and fundamental impact upon the
public." The Securities &c Exchange Commission required GM to in-
clude in its proxy statement Campaign-sponsored proposals to enlarge
the Board of Directors (in order to permit public representatives on
the Board), and to create a Shareholders Committee for Corporate
Responsibility, but refused to require the inclusion of resolutions on
pollution, mass transit, minority employment and franchises, and
insurance.
At a stockholders meeting in May, the Campaign GM resolutions
were rejected overwhelmingly, receiving about three per cent of the
vote. Defeat of the proposals came as no surprise to the campaign co-
ordinators, who regard the campaign as a success in furthering the
goal of corporate responsibility to the public. Moore noted that "we
53. sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 471, 560 (1970).
54. See N.Y. Times, May 23, 1970, at 15, col. 1 (discussing the stockholders' meeting).
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are using the resolutions as vehicles for this fight, but the real fight is
to open up the corporation, to force it to respond to whatever the
public articulates." By generating debate within institutions which
hold General Motors stock, such as universities and foundations, as
well as among the public generally, Moore feels that Campaign GM
has "made the issues extremely visible," an important first step toward
corporate accountability.
The Corporate Responsibility Project and other efforts aimed at
pressuring corporations to heed the demands for product and environ-
mental quality can be seen in part as a response to the failure of ad-
ministrative agencies. Designed to regulate business activity "in the
public interest," agencies such as the ICC, the FTC, and the FCC
typically had an initial period of vigorous activity directed toward
specific evils which led to their creation. In recent years, however, these
agencies have notoriously failed to play the active champion of an
ill-organized public. It is no exaggeration to say that consumer and
environmental advocates today see the agencies less as a solution than
as part of the problem.
The most publicized effort to expose and to correct the fumblings
and inadequacies of administrative agencies has been that led by Ralph
Nader. Nader's first crusade, on behalf of automobile safety, made him
a public figure in 1966 after the attempts of General Motors to invest-
igate and discredit him were exposed. He established the Center for
Study of Responsive Law in June, 1969, institutionalizing an opera-
tion that had been growing since the 1966 investigations.6- The Center
is staffed by six full-time lawyers in addition to Nader, one political
scientist, and one physician, and is supplemented during the summer
by law, medical, engineering and graduate students-196 of them
during the summer of 1970.
Nader starts from a conviction that the basic evil in American
society is concentrated corporate power. The Center's actions are
directed toward making corporations and regulatory agencies give
greater weight in their decision-making to the consumer interest. To
that end, the Center investigates corporate and agency activity, pub-
lishes reports to embarrass officials and shock the public, badgers ad-
ministrative agency personnel, and at times seeks relief in the courts.
The first major agency study criticized the Federal Trade Com-
55. In July, 1970, Nader founded a new public interest law firm called the Public
Interest Research Group. As the sole proprietor, Nader emplo)-s--at minimum salaries-
thirteen full-time lawyers who will use a variety of legal tcchniques to help make large
institutions accountable to the public.
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mission, pointing to its extreme laxity and calling for major reor-
ganization;56 this report was the first of several critical studies which
bore fruit in a proposal by the then-FTC Chairman Weinberger for
a thorough restructuring of the agency.57 The Center's recent report
on the Interstate Commerce Commission 8 went even further in its
recommendations, urging the complete dismantling of the ICC and
the establishment of a new regulatory apparatus. In-depth studies of
the Agriculture Department, the Food and Drug Administration,"
the administrators of the air 0 and water pollution control laws (De-
partments of the Interior and HEW), and the administrators of the
occupational health and safety laws (Departments of Labor, Interior,
and HEW) are all either in process or completed.0 1 Significantly, these
investigations have encountered agency secrecy, enabling Nader to
raise issues about citizen access to government records under the
Freedom of Information Act.62
Aside from specific successes, Nader has clearly had an overwhelming
impact on the growing consumer movement and is aware of the effects
of his work on citizen consciousness. He gave several reasons for
selecting the consumer area as the focus of his activity. It affects the
entire range of the population by raising fundamental values. "The
consumer issue shows the lack of fair play not to the Panthers, but to
Joe Doe. It is a litmus test of the hypocrisy of the power structure."
Conduct such as tampering with markets, false advertising, and seeking
special favors from regulators show corporate activities to be corrupt
even under the corporations' own market ideology. The consumer issue
"lets you talk about 'market power' and 'concentration of power' in con-
crete terms. It is supposed to be a free market, but how much compara-
tive information can you, the consumer, obtain from the manufacturer
about your car?"
The focus of the Center's work, then, is less advocacy than investi-
56. E. Cox, R. FELLMmTH & J. SCHuLz, THE N&DER REzoRT ON THE FRDERAL TRAU
COMMISSION.
57. See N.Y. Times, June 9, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
58. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1970, at 67, col. 3.
59. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1970, at 17, col. 1 (report quoted as charging that the
agency had been "unable to exert any meaningful influence on behalf of the food-
consuming public').
60. See N.Y. Times, May 13, 1970, at 6, col. 1.
61. The Center will soon cast its net even wider with studies of the pulp and paper
industry in Maine, the First National City Bank of New York, and the corporate re-
sponsibility of DuPont as respects the state of Delaware.
62. Nader, Freedom From Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 i-msv. Civ.
RiGHTs-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 1 (1970).
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gation.6 3 The reason that corporate power is so vulnerable, according
to Nader, is that Americans possess an underlying value system which
will produce necessary changes when it is confronted by all the facts.
"Who needs Marxist-Leninist rhetoric when you can get them on
good old Christian ethics?" His studies document the failure of the
agencies to fulfill their mandates, and shatter the consumer's confident
assumption that the agencies are protecting him. Like those who pub-
lish or litigate, Nader relies on widespread public response to abuse
of widely shared values to force decision-makers to respect diffuse
consumer interests.
Unlike lawyers for the poor or for political and cultural dissidents,
advocates of consumer and environmental causes represent values
whose time seems to have come in the minds of an American majority.
The developing public consciousness in these areas has produced some
major changes in a relatively short period of time; the isolated protests
of yesterday have become uncontroversial elements of major-party
platforms today. The apparent successes of the movement, however,
may pose an obstacle to the goals of those who see shoddy products
and abuses of the environment as symbols of a deeper and more press-
ing need for public control over the institutions which have such
enormous power over individual lives. It is not unrealistic to expect
that as the battle becomes focused on issues affecting more significantly
the distribution of power in American society, the most militant
lawyers for consumer and environmental values will take on more of
the forms and strategies of lawyers for political and cultural dissidents.
II. The Economics of Public Interest Law
The major obstacle in the effort to provide full representation to
underrepresented interests is the necessity for a massive infusion of
resources into an area which promises little return through traditional
fees. While established law firms have only recently begun to become
63. The usefulness of research and investigation to further major law reform has
been demonstrated in the ciminal justice field by the Vera Institute of justice. Most
noted for its studies leading to the Manhattan Bail Project which spurred bail reform
throughout the country, the Institute undertakes long-term experiments and projects,
often in cooperation with the New York City police department and judiciary, to test
hypotheses about law enforcement and corrections. Unlike Nader, the lawyers and sci-
entists at Vera do not see themselves as advocates for a constituency or political philos.
ophy. As staff lawyer Andrew Schaefer put it, "Our client is the criminal justice sys-
tem." Vera's approach is most effective in achieving concrete but relatively isolated
reforms: by demonstrating the viability of an idea through empirical testing and re-
search, the Institute can put upon defenders of the status quo a heavy burden of proof.
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involved in a systematic way, government and foundation grants,
private contributions, and reduced client fees have supported lawyers
willing to accept salaries which are in most cases far below what they
could earn in private practice. 64 A central difficulty arising from the
need to seek financing from sources other than clients is that the
source of funds may place explicit or implicit conditions on their use
which make the lawyer less effective in his advocacy. And the search
for funds is itself a time-consuming process which may interfere with
legal work.
A. Support of Public Interest Activity by Commercial Law Firms
In response primarily to agitation by associates and law students,
some major commercial law firms have systematically undertaken
to provide legal services to non-paying clients.05 Formal arrangements
64. Another source of manpower for public interest law is the law schools. Spurred
by the increased demands by their students for "relevance" in the curriculum, several
law schools have established clinical programs in which law students under the direction
of practicing attorneys provide legal services to the poor. Law students have also been
utilized by public interest law firms, either during the summer or through an "intensive
semester" arrangement with law schools. These arrangements are embraced by the
public interest firms not only for the manpower they provide, but also for tile contribn'
tion they make to the education of law students in dealing with social problems.
Ralph Nader, for example, is employing 196 student volunteers this summer-60% of
them law students-to conduct his studies and investigations of government agencies,
corporations, and law firms; many of these students will continue their work after
returning to school in the fall. Twelve students spent a semester this spring at the
Center for Law and Social Policy; besides working on specific projects, they met twice a
week in seminars with members of the staff to discuss the various undertakings of tile
Center. The Washington Research project has a similar program for undergraduate
students: through an affiliation with Clark College in Atlanta, the Project takes five
to ten students each semester for training in the federal decision-making process, with
the hope that they will go back to their local communities and organize projects or work
with black elected officials.
Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to engage law students in attacking problems
of the poor community is Jean Cahn's Urban Law Institute in Washington, D.C. The
Institute is an adjunct to George Washington Law School, and has a working relation-
ship with the Neighborhood Legal Services Project and VISTA. Under a revised model
to begin this fall, the Institute's practicing attorneys have appointments as Adjunct
Professors at George Washington, and offer courses in federal programs and community
organization. The field work is formally structured as a special kind of law office under
subcontracts with the NLSP and with private law firms in Washington. Aside from their
activities in group representation, community organization, and consulting with grotups
of poor people, students at the Institute design new institutions and new approaches to
community problems, discussed at pp. 1089-90 supra. The program, combining field work
with academic scrutiny, follows what Mrs. Cahn calls "the classical pattern of Immersion,
retreat and meditation, followed by a re-entry with renewed dedication and expanded
vision."
65. The sources and results of the increased interest by private firms in pro bono
work have been discussed in a number of recent articles, and the reader is referred to
that literature for a survey and analysis of the possibilities and limitations of tile move-
ment. A recently conducted survey is Note, Pro Bono Work and the Private Bar, soon to
be published in the Harvard Law Review. Elsewhere in this Journal, Edgar and
Jean Cahn explore the potential contributions of private firms to public interest law.
Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public Interest in Pliblic
Interest Law, 79 YALE LJ. 1005 (1970). See also Berlin, Roisman and Kessler, Ptiblic
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developed by these firms range from "released time," to a separate
department or branch office, to integration with the firm's paying busi-
ness. A representative model is that of the Washington firm of Arnold
& Porter, under which one partner spends full time and other lawyers
up to fifteen per cent of their time on work pro bono publico. As a
source of support for public interest activity, private law firms offer
an enormous pool of lawyer time and talent. At first glance, only the
reluctance of private lawyers to accept less income than they might
otherwise make seems to prevent full harnessment of their resources to
the needs of the underrepresented. However, while the absence of a
genuine commitment is probably the primary obstacle, other factors
complicate the effort to involve the commercial bar in public interest
activity.
In the first place, members of commercial law firms are unlikely to
have personal knowledge of the problems of the poor or contact with
those who cannot afford legal representation. One attempt to meet this
problem is made by the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law, formed in 1963 at the request of President Kennedy. While its
first major effort was to represent civil rights workers in Mississippi,
it now has thirty full-time staff members in fourteen cities attempting,
as National Director James Robertson put it, "to make private lawyers
into public interest lawyers."
M. C. Miskovsky, former National Director, stresses the importance
of involving the private bar in civil rights work, both because the bar
brings technical expertise and experience with governmental institu-
tions to that work and because active involvement makes lawyers more
sympathetic to the problems of the poor. On the local level, the Boston
Urban Areas Project, with two staff lawyers and twenty-five law firms
working on more than one hundred projects, suggests the extent to
which the Committee can utilize the resources of private firms. The
Boston Project has, among other efforts, undertaken a comprehensive
study of the lower criminal courts of Boston, negotiated on behalf
of the Tufts Afro-American Society to assure minority employment on
University construction, represented tenant groups seeking greater
rights in public housing, and provided business development assis-
tance for black entrepreneurs.
Lack of contact with poor people and their problems is probably
Interest Law, 35 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 675, 680-684 (1970); Berman & Cahn, Bargaining forjustice: The Law Students' Challenge to the Law Firms, 5 HAsY. Civ. Rzolrrs.Civ. L0.
L REv. 16, 20-21 (1970).
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the most easily remedied obstacle to large-scale public interest activity
by private firms. More difficult to overcome is the barrier created by
the commercial firm's primary commitment to serving the needs of
corporate clients. Several of the lawyers with whom we talked suggested
that there is something about the traditions and conditioned expecta-
tions and frames of reference at large commercial firms which make
lawyers at such firms unsuited to represent many clients who are not in
the establishment.0 0 This orientation also seems to limit the kinds of
clients and causes which the firms feel comfortable with: both the sub-
ject matter and the style of public interest law may create real or
imagined conflicts of interest with fee-generating work, especially when
the firm must undertake major actions against government or corporate
clients. In addition, where the commercial lawyer is willing to repre-
66. Marshall Patner related an incident which vividly illustrates this point. He was
representing the "Coalition," a group of community organizations-including street
gangs-which in 1969 closed down constructions projects in downtown Chicago as part
of a campaign to force unions and builders to employ more black workers. The parties
were brought together before the Mayor in order to negotiate a settlement to the dis.
pute. During the negotiations, Patner recalls, "we were never invited to speak, although
the union and builder lawyers spoke. The Coalition members were their own spokes.
men." Patner felt that regular commercial firm lawyers would have found this silent
role psychologically wearing. He also felt that "regular" lawyers would not have felt
comfortable with the kind of relief which B3PI ultimately achieved for the coalition.
The proposal offered by the builders and unions centered around the idea of an ad.
ministrative board, composed of two representatives from the builders, two from the
union, two from the Coalition, plus the Mayor.
The Coalition said "Hell no. We'll be outvoted." Under tremendous pressure one
day, and it is hard to say why, the builders and unions said, "You stick to our
six-plus-one, and we'll agree to an appeals committee. We'll have one from our
side of the table, one from yours, and a neutral picked by those two." To me, that
was extraordinary, and we had contributed-the lawyers could honestly say that we
had contributed by pressure here, a note there, and a lot of thinking. And then tile
blacks rejected the whole 3-man committee. It's very clear why: what was an ap-
peals committee to them? They never had a court that they sensed anything front,
why should this one be any different? What they wanted was to get back even to
the six-plus-one, because it would at least be sensitive to political pressure. So they
abolished what we thought we had achieved. That's pretty classical, and we're
pleased.
Marian Edelman was the most articulate spokesman for the idea that the orientation
of commercial firms makes them unsuited to handle cases for poor people:
I'm going to police anything that goes from here to private law firms. They just
don't understand what is at stake. These people-who are my best friends--are on
civil rights boards all over the state, and when you really get into them on what
the relief ought to be, on what the federal government ought to do, they all have
very narrow views of the government role in private industry. When we asked for
relief in Crown-Zellerbach which was very far-reaching, you could have a five-hour
discussion with your liberal friends that is just vicious about how the courts really
shouldn't be granting that relief. We don't have those kind of hang-ups. We don't
have the industry mentality. If you have been representing private firms all your
life and your big thing is to win to save their money and get your fee, you have
a very different perspective than the client in Louisiana who has been screwed out
of a promotion. ... What I think is needed is a new type of law firm, a new breed
of lawyers with a different outlook, who haven't grown up in the encrusted legal
system, who do not have pre-conceived notions about how you proceed in cases,
and who have a respect and understanding for their clientele.
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sent a dissident or insurgent group, his primary commitment to and
daily contact with the wealthy and powerful may generate tension be-
tween himself and his client.
Whatever the reasons, the volume of public interest work by private
firms remains small in comparison with the need. While lawyers from
the largest metropolitan firms have a long and estimable record of
service to the community and to "the public interest,"07 the needs and
demands of underrepresented groups today-and consequently the
nature of public interest practice-create tensions with the lawyer's
paying clients not present when the pro bono work involved repre-
senting indigent criminal defendants or working for procedural re-
form. Lawyers are probably more effective, and certainly less con-
strained by client or intra-firm pressure, when their primary commit-
ment is to the underrepresented. Where the commercial firm acknowl-
edges such limitations upon its own involvement in public interest
work, an alternative might be to assist independent public interest
firms by making direct grants or yearly tithes. To date, however, such
contributions have been rare.
B. Government Funding
The OEO Legal Services Program, founded in 1964, attempts to
provide continuing representation for the poor. As long as Legal Ser-
vices provides low-visibility assistance, it is not politically endangered.
But the danger of withdrawal of support increases as a particular pro-
67. Daniel Freed, now a professor at Yale Law School and formerly director of the
office of criminal justice in the Department of Justice, gives credit for important reform
in the criminal law field to private lawyers who did uncompensated volunteer work.
Though the criminal law reform is commonly credited to the Warren Court decisions
or to legislation such as the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, these were merely the end
products of work which began in the fifties or earlier. Private firm lawyers normally
engaged in civil and administrative practice represented indigent defendants in thou-
sands of cases on a "one-shot" basis. They brought to this pro bono work the same in-
tellectual training and meticulous technique that served them in private civil practice;
and in working up their criminal cases from scratch, they began what may finally xe-
suit in a fundamental reexamination of the criminal process.
In a piece elsewhere in this Journal, Abe Fortas argues that private law firms have
come a long way toward developing a sense of public responsibility. Fortas, Thurman
Arnold and the Theatre of the Law, 79 YALE L.J. 988, 994 (1970). Others take a less
sanguine view. In considering the life of a distinguished private firm law)er in a recent
book review, loyd Cutler asks whether any large firm or its senior members would
win public attributes accorded Emory Buckner in his time. His answer is revealing-
I doubt it, but not because the basic structure and character of law firms have
deteriorated since Emory Buckner's time. To the contrary, firms have improved
considerably; they now do a better job of assisting their business clients to discern
where the public interest lies, of devoting more time to people unable to afford
services, and of shaping the law into a more effective instrument for achieving socialjustice. The reason is that the society as a whole is changing even faster than the
law firms. The law firms, though trying harder, appear to their critics to be falling
behind in their efforts to be "relevant" to the solution of society's current problems.
Cutler, Book Review, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1746, 1747 (1970).
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gram gains high visibility or seeks to advance a particular social or
geographic group. The program may then encounter local opposition
if it relies heavily on the Bar Association or local government for sup.
port, or national opposition if its efforts appear especially threatening.
The history of one of the most aggressive legal services programs,
California Rural Legal Assistance, suggests some of the limitations of
government funding. James Lorenz described the process by which
CRLA was funded over the unanimous opposition of the Board of the
California Bar Association. The first step was to draw up a proposal,
which was submitted to OEO and to the Bar Association.
The proposal had colorful language .... It was just at this time
that Chavez was marching to Sacramento. If I had been smart I
would have written four pages in absolutely neutral, boring lan-
guage that would have been more acceptable.
But Sargent Shriver, then head of OEO, had decided to expand the
legal services programs, to make some new departures, particularly in
rural areas. So OEO sent Lorenz to lobby for his program in Congress
despite the attitude of the Bar Association.
CRLA was funded with $1,276,000 in late May of 1966. According
to Lorenz,
The most notable condition in our grant was and is that we can-
not supply legal representation to the United Farm Workers
Organizing Committee, although we can represent farm workers,
groups of farm workers, and general classes of farm workers. The
reason for this special situation is political: Shriver feared an out-
cry from San Joaquin Valley congressmen if government money
was given to the Union to enable the Union to sue growers.
Another obvious limit imposed on CRLA is in terms of the income
level and make-up of its clientele. It may represent only those persons
who earn under $2200 (or $2200 plus $500 for each dependent). At
least fifty per cent of the clients are Mexican-Americans, the group
which Lorenz had most in mind when formulating the proposal, and
a great many of them are farm workers. But CRLA ensures its good
standing with OEO by also representing consumers, welfare recipients,
and an increasing number of students and senior citizens in the larger
towns.
Gary Bellow, one of the key figures in the organization of CRLA
and now a professor at the University of Southern California, contends
that government sponsorship precludes effective community orga-
nizing:
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When we started we assumed that withdrawal of funds wouldn't
matter if we could first build a political base among the poor.
This takes a good deal more time, more trust, more community
work than we were willing to recognize. To have carried out this
approach would have involved focusing on a small number of
offices with seven or eight attorneys in each and an enormous
amount of supervision, both in political perspectives and in law-
yering. It would have involved four or five years as we developed
contact, sophistication, and skills. This can't be done by a poverty
program with year-by-year funding because definable, explicit
results are constantly required to justify the program's existence.
The attacks on such a program far exceed in intensity and ef-
fectiveness the capacity of the program to build a deep political
base to counteract it. Coalitions can be created that enable the
program to survive, but a focus and emphasis on political com-
munity organizing probably can't be done with government funds
at all.
But in Bellow's view, one bolstered by the defeat of the Murphy
Amendment (which would have given state governors greater control
over the administration of the Legal Services Program), CRLA can
survive for a long time as presently constituted, providing a large
volume of services from its regional offices and test case litigation from
its central office.
In terms of government funding of legal services for the poor, the
major structural alternative to the OEO legal services program is
direct payment to lawyers for the services which they perform on be-
half of the poor. Bellow believes that such a system of "judicare" is
an essential next step, but sees little likelihood that such a program
will be enacted, principally because of opposition from the bar and
from OEO.
C. Funding by Private Foundations
As with government support, the need to procure and maintain
foundation support limits the kinds of activities in which the lawyer
can engage. There are, however, some atypical examples. Perhaps the
most fortunate is the Chicago firm of Patner & Karaganis, supported
by Businessmen for the Public Interest, a group of Illinois indus-
trialists. Far from imposing restraints on the firm's activity, B.P.I.
gives the firm's aggressive efforts a boost in credibility. In a formal
sense, B.P.I. is Patner's client; but the distinction between attorney
and client is blurred, since they share a joint commitment to and a
similar perception of "the public interest." Patner's relationship with
his source of funds seems to differ from that of firms funded by large
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foundations in two significant ways. On the one hand, Patner's activi-
ties are truly "on behalf of" B.P.I., and there is little of the distance
between lawyer and source of funds that is-perhaps intentionally-
characteristic of operations funded by large and diversified founda-
tions. At the same time, however, Patner is highly independent of his
source of funds, since the joint-venture nature of the enterprise gives
him effective power to choose his own causes and shape his own ac-
tivities. A similar relationship exists between Monroe Freedman and the
Philip Stern Family Fund, which finances his Community Law Firm
through a grant to the Lincoln Memorial Congregational Temple; the
seven-man Board of Directors consists of Freedman, Mr. & Mrs. Stern,
and four members of the church's congregation.
For most firms, the search for initial funding requires that the firm
establish a Board of Directors. As Marian Wright Edelman describes
it: "Basically, foundations demand nice, respectable boards-it's a
front. You have to have Arthur Goldberg as chairman of your board
to get two cents." In her view, the basic disadvantage in having a
Board is that the need to consult will often preclude swift, effective
action. Her organization, the Washington Research Project, has ob-
tained foundation funding without a Board.
The main support we have we didn't even ask for, it was just
handed to us. They gave us $25,000. With one exception, every
application I have put into a foundation was requested. It's mostly
a lucky fluke. Mississippi was the best place to be when I was there,
because everybody came through. You got to know all the foun-
dation people in a different capacity when you weren't asking for
money for yourself. This is not to say that it isn't going to be
tougher now.
The experience of the Center for Law and Social Policy is more
typical. The Center was opened in August, 1969, to provide Washing-
ton-style representation for the "interests of the poor and the ordinary
citizen" on health, consumer, and environment issues. For its first
year, the Center has a projected budget of $380,000. Despite an im-
pressive Board of Directors, Charles Halpern, Director of the Center,
spent at least half of his time in the first few months raising funds
to meet that budget and visiting law schools to interview students and
professors interested in working for a semester at the Center.
Probably the most stable areas of foundation support are education
and research. The Conservation Foundation, a not-for-profit educa-
tional organization financed primarily by grants from the Ford, Rocke-
feller, and Mellon Foundations, has a single legal associate, Malcolm
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Baldwin. Baldwin characterized the Foundation as trying "to deter-
mine what values people should have consistent with human nature
and a finite world with finite resources." While it seeks to have an
impact on the public by demonstrating the long-term effects of short-
term desires, its activities are not intensely political. For example, the
Foundation sponsored a Conference on Law and the Environment at
which sxty-five lawyers and professors discussed papers on litigation,
constitutional law and legal education, including one prepared by
Baldwin on the Santa Barbara oil spill. In addition, Baldwin holds
occasional informal meetings of Washington environmental lawyers,
publishes a newsletter, and, with the Public Law Education Institute,
will soon publish a monthly loose-leaf service to be called The En-
vironmental Law Reporter. The Foundation's subdued tone and edu-
cational orientation minimize the danger that its funds will be cut off.
For those whose activities generate political controversy, the con-
straints may be much greater.08 Marian Wright Edelman indicated
that the Washington Research Project
stays away from the big foundations, although we have a Carnegie
grant, mainly for the education component. I really want to keep
it to the educational component. I wouldn't go to Ford for money,
because I don't want their conditions. The little foundations are
the most gutsy. That is why we have deliberately sought broad
support, so no foundation can cripple us.
Foundation funds for public interest law are limited, and there
seems to be competition for support at least among some of the Wash-
ington firms. Edgar Cahn, Director of the Citizen's Advocate Center
which this year has suffered a fifty per cent cutback,c0 believes that
limited funds and lawyer time should be utilized "where legal re-
sources do something that virtually nothing else can do. And simply
as a matter of historical fact, it has been only minority interests and
political dissent whose access to politicial systems has been limited to
the courts and to legal representation." In his view, environmentalists,
68. Jack Drake, staff counsel to the Selma Inter-Religious Project in Selma, Alabama,
which has been foundation-funded since 1968, wrote:
Dealing with foundations is a little like watching classical Japanese theatre. You
force yourself to watch for each subtle nuance: the raised eyebrow, a slight twist
of the -wrist, a change in voice inflection, or a seemingly innocent inquiry. But even
with the subtleties, no control has been exercised over S..P.'s programs or policies,
to my knowledge, by any of the Foundations now giving us aid.
J. Drake, Selma Inter-Religious Project, Feb. 20, 1970 (paper prepared for 31st Nat'l
Convention, Natl Lawyers Guild). This is true despite the fact that S.LP. is attempting
to develop the political and economic power of rural blacks.
69. Berman & Calm, Bargaining for Justice: The Law Students' Challenge to the
Law Firms, 5 H~Av. Crv. RIGHs-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 16, 19 n.13 (1970).
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for example, can gain access to political forums without relying on
lawyers or outside funding.7 0
Others fear that foundations will lose interest in funding law firms.
Tony Roisman, of Berlin, Roisman, & Kessler, remarked that "there
isn't any future in foundations. Five years from now there will be a
new vogue. For all we know it could be sexual freedom-putting in
foundation money for communes all over the country." The increas-
ingly hostile attitude of the federal government toward innovative
foundation ventures-in particular the involvement of the Ford Foun-
dation in the New York decentralization crisis and in the infamous
"Kennedy Fellowships'"-may further restrict their willingness to
support law firms. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1970, the primary
relevant limitation on foundations was that "carrying on propaganda
or otherwise attempting to influence legislation" could not be "a
substantial part" of their activities.72 Congressional conservatives led
by Rep. Wilbur Mills became so upset with the "radical" activities
of foundation-supported groups that they pushed a bill through the
House Ways and Means Committee (chaired by Rep. Mills) which
would have subjected to stiff penalties any foundation sponsoring an
activity which directly or indirectly affected the actions of any govern-
ment agency.
The bill was amended before passage; as the law presently stands,
a private foundation will be subjected to a ten per cent tax7a on any
expenditure which supports an attempt to influence legislation by
appealing to the general public or by communicating with a legislator
or legislative employee except in response to a written request7 4 If
the expenditure is not "corrected" within ninety days, a tax equal to
one hundred per cent of the expenditure is imposed.d To ensure
70. See also Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-Thl Public
Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1006 (1970).
71. See Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 25-61 (1969).
72. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501(c)(3).
73. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4945(a)(1).
74. "iTMhe term 'taxable expenditure' means any amount paid or incurred by a
private foundation for-
(1) any attempt to influence any legislation through an attempt to affect the opinion
of the general public or any segment thereof, and
(2) any attempt to influence legislation through communication with any member
or employee of a legislative body, or with any other government official or employcc
who may partidpate in the formulation of the legislation (except technical advice
or assistance provided to a government body or to a committee or other subdivision,
as the case may be),
other than through making available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or
research." INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4945(e).
75. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4945(b)(1).
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that no organization which it supports engages in any of these ac-
tivities, the foundation must exercise "expenditure responsibility" as
to those organizations30
Because the purpose of foundation-supported law firms is to deal
with important and timely questions of public policy, they will in-
evitably be dealing with matters of legislative concern at least some
of the time. The Tax Reform Act seems clearly to preclude use of the
press to mobilize public support for legislation, but the "written re-
quest" exception may provide an important avenue of access to legis-
lators. For firms whose primary activity is research, a provision which
allows "making available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or
research" should provide shelter from the penalties for attempts to
influence legislation.77 The Internal Revenue Service has not yet
promulgated regulations under the relevant sections of the Act; the
content of the regulations will go far in determining the permissible
scope of foundation activity.78 At least as important as the specifics of
the new tax law, however, will be the response of the foundations. If
they fear further regulation, they may cease to support any but research
or educational ventures. But if they feel that Congressional ire has
subsided, they may again begin to sponsor new ventures-albeit with
careful controls.
D. Funding through Membership Contributions
The history of the Environmental Defense Fund suggests two ways
to finance legal action by appeal to the general public. E.D.F. was
incorporated on a not-for-profit basis in 1967. Armed with testimony
of friendly scientists, lawyer Victor Yannacone, Jr. and scientist Charles
Wunster led a fight to ban DDT at hearings in Wisconsin and Michi-
gan. Their strategy was to generate sufficient publicity to arouse com-
munity political and financial support. As a result, public contributions
constituted $82,000 of the $112,000 received during 1969.
Since Yannacone's departure in the fall of 1969, E.D.F. has em-
barked on a drive to build a national lay membership of several hun-
dred thousand similar to that of the ACLU. According to Edward
Rogers, the new General Counsel, the purposes of the drive are to de-
velop a wider financial base, to facilitate public education, to create
76. INr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4945(h).
77. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4945(e) (quoted note 74 supra).
78. See generally Note, Regulating the Political Activities of Foundations, 83 H~ny.
L. REv. 1843 (1970).
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an "early warning system," and to ensure accountability to the public.70
If successful, the drive will result in greater stability for expanded
operations; probable future targets include leaded gasoline and the
insecticides dieldrin, aldrin, and endrin.
Similarly, the Conservation Law Foundation of Boston finances its
annual budget by gifts and by dues-paying ($10 per year) Foundation
Associates. Despite its small budget, the Foundation survives because
its lawyers are volunteers. Executive Director Benjamin Nason is em-
ployed as a lobbyist by the Massachusetts Forest and Park Association.
Another lawyer, Oakes Plimpton, is a full-time volunteer.
The major disadvantage of the membership method of financing is
that building a membership is a difficult and time-consuming process
which diverts manpower from the primary tasks of the organization.
Where the values pursued by the organization are deeply felt and
widely shared, however, funding through membership dues may pro-
vide a stable basis of support which has the added benefit of providing
a popular base for the lawyers' activities. The ACLU has flourished
for fifty years relying almost solely on small contributions from its
members. In the environmental area, rising public consciousness may
facilitate the process.
E. Self-Supporting Firms
To avoid the restraints which come from working within the tradi-
tional law firm or from accepting outside funding, several groups of
lawyers have set out to generate their own funds by charging reduced
fees or by accepting fees on only a small percentage of their work. One
firm in the first category is Berlin, Roisman, & Kessler, which has
operated on a minimum budget from an appropriately unpretentious
office in an old house in Washington since January, 1969. Dissatisfied
with corporate and agency practice, the three lawyers set up a new
firm to fill the needs for representation which they had perceived in
their previous employment.
Their initial hope was to start out with a sufficient amount in guaran-
teed retainers to cover a minimum budget of $90,000 for the first year.
When that proved impossible, they decided to open the firm anyway.
The firm's first major undertaking was on behalf of the Consumer
Federation of America, which opposed promulgation of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code. From testimony and publicity arising out of
this work, the firm received sufficient exposure to attract further clients,
79. Letter from Edwalrd Lee Rogers to the Yale Law Journal, March 13, 1970.
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primarily organizations, although many of them have yet to make the
financial commitment to hire lawyers even at reduced fees.
The lawyers split the firm's income evenly and hope that each will
earn about $15,000 per year during the early years, but they have pro-
vided for division according to need should income fall much below
that figure. While the salary is much less than the lawyers could earn
in other forms of Washington practice, Roisman asserted that "psychic
income" derived from representing only clients "we feel perfectly com-
fortable about representing" more than makes up the difference.
The firm has survived for more than a year, a fact that seems to
demonstrate the viability of the reduced-fee model, at least in Wash-
ington, and for a limited number of firms. s° Continued development of
citizens' organizations with sufficient resources to retain lawyers at a
substantial fraction of the going rate will improve the prospects for
economic success of lawyers who concentrate on issues which appeal
to the middle class, such as health and consumer and environmental
protection. From the perspective of representing the unrepresented,
the model has the weakness that the firm can do only a limited amount
of free work and must appeal to those few conservation and consumer
groups which can afford a retainer, but the advantage that all lawyer
time is spent on representing clients rather than courting foundations
or Congressmen.
Political firms have developed other types of self-support. These
firms follow the basic pattern of the "old left" law practice: some polit-
ical cases and some commercial work. The Law Commune in New
York supports the salaries and expenses of six lawyers and eight
secretaries by taking twenty-five per cent paying cases arising out
80. Another self-supporting public interest law firm in Washington is Asher & Schnei-
derman, formed in late 1969 by an associate at Arnold & Porter and a young lawyer from
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. Michael Schneiderman explained that
he and his partner intended to devote 25% of their time to commercial, "high-lcver-
age" work, and the rest to generally nonpaying public interest activity. Unlike Berlin.
Roisman & Kessler, Asher and Schneiderman do not insist that all their cases be "in
the public interest," in the sense of affiring the lawyers' own social goals, and in fact
enjoy much of their commercial work. We would work for almost anybody in order
to finance the public interest work. We have handled bankruptcies, real estate, personal
injury, almost everything. But we drew the line on evictions, though we were offered
the chance and it would have earned a lot of money for us."
Six months after the firm was founded, Schneiderman accepted a short-term job with
the Governor of Illinois, and the firm became dormant. Compare note 118 infra.
Schneiderman says, however, that the firm was successful for its first six months, though
not without its problems-which derived primarily from the firm's small size. Schnei-
derman believes that the prospects for self-supporting public interest firms are good,
if they are willing to handle high-paying corporate work alone with their public inter-
est activities. Though he refers to Berlin, Roisman & Kessler as "real pioneers," he
suggests that there are not enough "public interest" clients who can afford any legal
fees at all to support more than one or two small firms in Washington.
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of the drug and draft problems of "youth culture-white, middle
class kids who get into trouble." The lawyers draw salaries according
to need; the secretaries receive more money than the lawyers because
they are not in the communal money pot. In order to get good legal
secretaries, the Commune found that it had to pay the going rate.
The Boston firm of Flym, Zalkind, g& Silverglate relies on the same
market for its support. John Flym described the firm's practice:
Right now, like so many others, we have managed to get by on
money from selective service cases. The problem is not so much
getting enough money, but how much time and effort you are
willing to dedicate to practice of that sort. I think we do make a
conscious attempt to limit the amount of work we do of that sort-
that is, on behalf of people who don't need us. So we tell people
who walk in who can afford to pay that they are being charged
exorbitant rates. That is being done consciously and honestly, be-
cause we want them to subsidize our work on behalf of other
people.
The Chicago People's Law Office takes the contrary position in
seeking to limit its reliance on middle-class clients. Their orientation
is primarily to the neighborhood around them, raising the difficulty
that they may have to charge fees on the non-political work which
they do for the neighborhood poor. Consequently, they are still strug-
gling with their financial structure.
Gary Bellow commented:
Young guys in law schools who claim to want to do something
that is exciting and interesting generally want to do it at not too
great a financial loss. That's one aspect that can't change without
major changes in political orientation.
Bellow observed, however, that civil damage suits on behalf of the
poor could generate substantial lawyers' fees. Noting that attorney's
fees are awarded in many civil rights cases, including cases under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in all consumer cases
in California, Bellow suggested contingency fees in claims for puni-
tive damages against landlords. And because poor people are concerned
about rat bites, lead paint poisoning, and welfare maladministration,
the claims might be effective vehicles for organizing.
In general, the need for funding creates a trade-off between political
and economic independence. Government and the foundations are of
course economic institutions of enormous power and their support
frees the lawyer completely from the marketplace. Yet their support
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may mean overt or subtle restrictions on certain kinds of high-visibility
political activity. Lawyers who go the self-supportng route are under
no political constraints other than the wishes of their clients, but for-
sake economic independence and may for that reason have to accept
cases which they might otherwise not choose to take, and to accept an
even lower standard of living.
III. Clients, Constituencies and the Independent Lawyer
According to traditional theory, the lawyer is a "neutral" pro-
fessional who puts his skills at the disposal of whatever values or
interests come with a client through the office door. Even where the
lawyer has the luxury of choosing his clients, he rejects any notion that
representation either requires or implies an identification with the
goals of the client or the social effects of his representation. The
lawyer is responsible only for the quality of his professional services,
and since "everyone is entitled to representation" the lawyer insists
that he should not be criticized for the clients he represents.81 The
lawyers we talked with see this conception of the lawyer's role as
neither the most socially productive nor the most personally satisfying,
and they have embraced a different role in their own practices-by as-
serting the legitimacy of personal value choices in their work, and by
accepting responsibility for the effects of their professional acts. In
81. As Abe Fortas puts it, "Lawyers are agents, not principals; and they should
neither criticize nor tolerate criticism based upon the character of the client whom they
represent or the cause they prosecute or defend." Regardless of personal preferences,
the lawyer has traditionally represented any client for whom there was a "reasonable
prospect that the firm could contribute something of value for which payment could
and would be received." Fortas, Thurman Arnold and the Theatre of the Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 988, 1002, 991 (1970).
It is surely debatable whether reliance on the market to select clients is consistent with
a lawyer's claim to be value-neutral; in a society where wealth is unequally distributed,
to choose to represent those who can afford to pay large fees is to apply criteria which
favor certain interests in the society. Even if one agrees that a lawyer is not to be
criticized for the "character" or views of his client, surely it does not follow that the
lawyer is not responsible for the social consequences of his actions. Once a law.yer admits
that some standard for the selection of clients is used, why shouldn't he be held re-
sponsible for the basis of his choice and for the social consequences of applying that
standard?
The implications, to the traditional lawyer, of the phrase "everyone is entitled to
representation" are forcefully stated by Fortas:
If the interest of the client required the lawyer to advocate a position or seek a
result which he personally disliked or even which he considered contrary to
society's welfare, it was the lawyer's duty to do so with all his mind and heart,
subject only to the restrictions and proprieties which the rules and conventions
impose.
Id. at 996. But this use of the phrase, to justify representing whom he does, ignores the
way in which "everyone is entitled to representation" condemns the traditional lawyer
for whom he does not represent.
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doing so, they have changed the role of the client in the lawyer's prac-
tice. The public interest lawyer is a man with commitments which
precede and define the client; and the nature of his clients, his ac-
tivities, and his source of funds often allows him the freedom to assert
personal values in his professional work. The most independent is the
lawyer who sets his own priorities in matters to handle and who defines
his own positions-what Charles Reich terms a "primary being."82
Not all public interest lawyers are so independent. As we have already
seen, the lawyer's need for funding inevitably imposes some restric-
tions on him. In addition, the nature of the client and the structure
of the law firm may impose certain limitations, and may create a ten-
sion between the lawyer's goal of furthering his own values and the
goal of serving the needs of others.
A. Restrictions on Independence
1. Lawyers With Specific Clients
Public interest lawyers who deal with specific clients (whether in-
dividuals or organizations) generally select those clients according to
personal criteria: the lawyer's own values, his sense of what is im-
portant, his areas of interest and competence. But the lawyers insist
that once a client has been accepted, his interests control. As John
Flym said:
I don't find myself obligated to take the case of anyone who walks
in the door. If someone walks in and wants me to help him with
respect to a cause with which I am unsympathetic, then that's the
end of it. I just don't take the case. But if I take the case, it's a
matter of engaging in whatever rational, intelligent discussion I
can; the final decision is the client's, and I respect his decision.
I think it's arrogant, and I think lawyers are terribly arrogant, to
assume that they know best what is best for other people. That
happens all the time. I have my own sense of things, but I try to
be humble when I deal with other people and clients.
Marshall Patner agreed, noting that his clients "are not treated dif-
ferently from clients in a private firm. 83
82. Reich, Toward a Humanistic Study ol Law, 74 YALE L. 1402 (1408) (19065).
Ralph Nader uses the term "independent professional." Law Schools and the Law Firms,
THE NEw REPUBLmC, Oct. 11, 1969, at 20, 23 (reprinted in 54 MNN. L. REV. 493 (1970)),
83. Patner likes to tell the story of a case brought to him by a group that wanted
to save some trees which were going to be cut down in a park. In discussing the matter
with his clients, he pointed out that by marking the trees with white cloths (the govern.
ment attorney called them "rags'), they had raised an issue of symbolic speech under
the first amendment. The clients became enamored of this Issue, but Patner lkept lls
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Radical lawyers-whether they are house counsel to a single group
like NWRO, or, like the Law Commune, represent a number of
clients--claim to defer to the client for almost ideological reasons, a
notion that technique must serve those political purposes defined ex-
clusively by the group itself. One Commune lawyer argued that "the
lawyer's only political decision is at the outset, when he decides whether
he is going to work with a group-lawyers should not want to control
the Movement." The lawyer properly participates in political decision-
making only if he is a member of the Movement group, and then only
as a member, not as a lawyer-leader. The Commune lawyers place
their deference to clients in the context of their general attempt to
break down what they see as the traditional arm's length relationship
between the lawyer-"hung up on his self image as a professional"-
and the client. They seek "to demystify the law," and "at all points
to tell the client where he's at. We're honest with our clients in a way
that most lawyers aren't, and we have with them almost the relation
of friends."84
But the oft-repeated theme that "the client dominates" has signifi-
cant variations in actual practice. The client's role may be smaller
than theory suggests, and there are significant opportunities for the
lawyer to assert his personal values and goals even after a client is
selected. Obviously in some cases the client is largely a dummy, with
little personal stake in a matter; he is merely a device to get the lawyer
into court.85 In other cases he may have a significant personal interest
in the outcome; but even then his case may be selected on the explicit
condition that the lawyer will argue a certain "test case" theory which
reduces the client's chances of prevailing. If the case is a class action,
the real "client of interest" is an entire class of people with whom the
lawyer has, at most, selective contact.
In terms of the traditional theory of legal representation, the in-
attention on saving the trees. When he got the case "referred back for error on a
sleeper technical issue," the clients were furious, and protested that he had no right to
raise the technical issue, even though it achieved their original purpose of saving the trees.
84. While this attitude is consistent with the equality of professionals and non-
professionals within the Commune, and with the critique of a class society implicit in
most Movement politics, the description of clients as "friends" was also given by
Marian Edelman and Jim Lorenz. To the extent that the la-er's self-image as a
disinterested professional introduces a formality or distance, and a dehumanizing
element, into the lawyer/dient relationship, it is predictable that lauyers who concede a
personal commitment to their clients' goals would also be willing to approach their
clients as friends.
85. For example, in a case brought by Victor Yannacone, the plaintiff was Yanna-
cone's wife.
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volvement of a lawyer's personal values in a particular cause threatens
the paramount principle of the lawyer-client relationship, the idea of
total devotion to the client's interests as the client sees them. Although
the lawyers interviewed were hesitant to be very explicit, some did
indicate an occasional tension between the client's interests and the
lawyer's larger purposes. They insist, however, that the client's judg-
ment invariably prevails:
I see a conflict sometimes between my strategy preference for
presenting a case and the short-term interests of the client, but
I haven't sacrificed a client yet. Sometimes our clients themselves
are willing to forego a minor short-term advantage, especially
where the client is a more sophisticated group. They prefer to deal
with it on a wide basis. (Melvin Wulf, AGLU)
Our purpose in general is to take cases which have important
implications. Not infrequently, although it doesn't happen a lot,
we might have cases which develop in a way that might be detri-
mental to an individual client. An example of that is a capital
case in which we are going for broke trying to get a higher court
to establish a principle, and then the prosecutor will offer you a
plea, like five years and parole. We represent our client first, We
have had any number of cases that wash out because of some such
development, especially in the capital punishment area. It also
happens a lot in employment cases where the issue is seniority
or back pay, and the situation develops to the individual client's
advantage. We put it up to the client. "They're offering you this.
If we keep the case the chances of winning are X, if we lose you
may get nothing." Very often the client will take the deal. But
sometimes he'll say, "I went into this for the principle, not a
couple hundred bucks." (Jack Greenberg, Inc. Fund)
While the "client controls" model is undoubtedly simplistic, it is easy
to exaggerate the change in the lawyer-client relationship involved in
the representation of individual clients by public interest lawyers. The
texture of every relationship between lawyer and client gives the law-
yer a great deal of power to affect the client's choice: the lawyer has
expertise, and is trained to argue well.80 Where clients are poor people,
however, other factors may be present. For example, if the client is
86. Marian Edelman's remarks are revealing:
I'll argue with them. If they can argue me down, Ill accept it. The client-lawyer
relationship isn't like it is in private cases. You are friends, basically. A conflict
between the immediate interests of the client and a broader solution has been an
issue in some cases, but, again, I think you deal with that by simply saying to
people that they ultimately have tile veto. I learned early in Mississippi that you
always have a lot of plaintiffs, because you can expect to lose 10% of them. You
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not paying the lawyer, he is deprived of a pecuniary sanction and a
psychological advantage; and the client may be uneducated and there-
fore more deferential to the lawyer or more vulnerable to his control.8 7
The lawyer may inevitably make crucial decisions simply because he
is well-educated, quick-witted, or possessed of a domineering personal-
ity. One lawyer observed:
It's really an elitist decision. Much of that is inherent in legal
representation. The fact is that if you are a high-class smart lawyer
and you are representing a poor, black client or any ill-educated
client group, there is necessarily going to be this element. No
matter how militant your clients are, how much they push you
around and call you a white mother-fucking lawyer and stuff, you
still in a very meaningful sense have the whip hand. It is a very
interesting and complex relationship.
As client groups increase in sophistication, strength, and cohesive-
ness, the possibility of manipulation by the lawyer decreases. Today,
groups of blacks or Mexican-Americans or welfare recipients are likely
to be sufficiently suspicious of middle-class people, including public
interest lawyers, to demand strict accountability. Should the lawyer
want to manipulate client groups to further goals they don't share, he
will find his path blocked. And as client groups come to believe that
even the "sympathetic" lawyer should not participate in shaping the
groups' policies, the lawyer's role inevitably narrows. Recognizing the
trend toward strong client groups, and believing that a weaker client
alvays are very careful about the kind of plaintiffs. I alwvays knov an awful lot about
my plaintiffs before I file suit. You explain to them what might happen and what
their options are. On the whole, I think we have never had any problem when we
have dealt honestly with them, about what they can et and what the total com-
munity can get. I think it really is the kind of relaionship you have with your
clients and how you deal with them from the beginning.
87. Jim Lorenz cautioned against quickly jumping to the conclusion that in legal
service programs there is a unique kind of lawyer/client relationship:
I think it is a fiction [to say that legal services created a new laivyer/dient
relationship] because a number of the things we have done, lawyers at big firms
do . . .for example, comprehensive representation involving the lawyer taking the
initiative, such as anticipating effects of legislation or advising the Real Estate Board
to sponsor Proposition 14 ... While legal services lawvyers may have considerable
amount of freedom in choosing the means by which they try to obtain particular
results for their clients, this latitude is also enjoyed by private practitioners, to a
much greater extent than most people realize. If we analyze the nature of
attorney/client relationship generally, we will probably find that most clients are
result oriented and feel that it is the attorney's job to figure out the means.
But while it is good to point out similarities, the important differences should not be
lost. Aside from the possibility that big firm clients are less vulnerable to manipulation
by the lawyer, when the private lawyer takes the "initiative" or enjoys his "latitude"
the only interest he is trying to further is his client's; because te public interest
lawyer has in his work a commitment that may precede the client, the latyer's goals
and the client's may conflict.
1123
The Yale Law Journal
organization loses its possibilities for strength when an aggressive
middle-class lawyer gets deeply involved, CRLA has adopted guide-
lines to restrain lawyers from overreaching. s8 Under the guidelines, as
described by Jim Lorenz, (1) a GRLA lawyer doesn't join organizations
of poor people;89 (2) he doesn't serve as one of their officers or spokes-
men; (3) he doesn't take sides in disputes between community groups;
(4) he stays off picket lines; and (5) he refrains from making policy
decisions. "In other words," Lorenz added, "he restricts himself to serv-
ing as a legal advisor to the group, and doing what the group wants
once the group decides what it wants." It is important to realize that
this kind of lawyer for the poor has a relatively narrow role, with
relatively little independence. He serves groups with which he is in
personal sympathy, but he very much serves. A lawyer who hopes to
further his values and to work with increasingly sophisticated and
militant poor people's groups is well advised to be a lawyer who num-
bers deference to the client as one of his personal values.
2. Lawyers with both Clients and Constituencies
A striking and significant aspect of the practice of public interest
law is the frequency with which the lawyer's "client" cannot be ade-
quately described as the individual or organized group named as the
client in a particular matter. Many public interest lawyers, while
representing specific clients in most of their legal work, see themselves
as advocates for a much more loosely defined constituency or commu-
nity. The lawyer's relationship to that constituency affects his indepen-
dence in handling specific cases and, more importantly, in setting
priorities as to the matters he will handle.
A common example of such a dual commitment in the handling of
particular cases is the lawyer who represents a specific client in a class
action. Where the named plaintiffs in a class action control the lawsuit,
there may be a tension between their desires and the interest of the
88. See also the discussion of lawyers and organizing at pp. 1090.91 supra.
89. The lawyers in the New York Law Commune gave an additional reason for not
"running with" the groups they represent: since many of their client groups often break
the law, to run with a group is to risk arrest, thereby depriving the group of the
lawyer's usefulness as a lawyer. In addition, the Commune lawyers also said they simply
didn't have the time to get very involved with the groups the represent, althougIt
that had been their initial plan. This latter point was also made ty Jack Drake of the
Selma Inter-Religious Project; working in a rural area of the South, he represents
groups from a dozen or more counties, and this inevitably restricts his contact with tile
groups he represents. Drake, Selma Inter-Religious Project, Feb. 20, 1970 (paper pre-
pared for 31st National Convention at National Lawyers Guild).
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larger class. 0 It is often true, however, that the named plaintiffs are
nominal only. Even so, this does not mean that the "larger class" con-
trols the legal action. The lawyer's relationship to the class on whose
behalf he brings the suit is likely to be extremely limited. In class
actions, of course, courts are charged with determining whether the class
is adequately represented, but it is important to realize the extent to
which the lawyer is independent of the "class" client in determining
the positions he takes.
Because this inevitable independence may cause difficulties and mis-
understandings, CRLA has developed guidelines for attorneys in class
actions. First, attorneys have a duty to represent individually named
clients who have more than nominal interests; this not only ensures
that clients will be less likely to bail out of the case later on, or fold
on the witness stand, but also ensures that they will be giving the at-
torney direction. Second, poverty organizations which wil be affected
by class actions must be consulted before the cases are filed to ensure
that the class beneficiaries are in favor of the result being sought.
Third, where attorneys come up with new ideas for legal attacks, the
ideas are to be discussed with existing clients who have an established
relationship with the attorney, rather than with outside groups, so that
no solicitation is involved. Fourth, to the greatest extent possible, the
spokesmen for the class actions should be poor people's groups them-
selves, rather than the attorney; the purpose of this rule is to counteract
a seeming tendency among many legal services attorneys to make class
actions personal showpieces (with lots of personal publicity), a tendency
which can lead to cases that don't really assist the poor, and which can
lead judges to view class actions as children of "outside agitators."'O
The existence of a "constituency" for the lawyer is a phenomenon
which extends far beyond the limited example of class actions. The
lawyer who decides to devote his professional talent to the needs of a
particular community or social class adds a dimension to his role which
may restrict not only his independence in handling specific cases, but
also his choice of which matters to handle. On the one hand, a perceived
90. For example, in a class action consumer suit, the individual client may desire
a settlement while the members of the class may want to go to court to secure a
broad ruling.
91. Lorenz adds:
Otherwise, when we come into court, the judges think that the crse is cooked up
by a social reformer attorney. As the courts become more conservative, and the
power of the client groups grow, the role of the attorney, of necessity, must be more
circumspect.
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"constituency" may be merely a way of articulating personal values or
a personal commitment. The lawyer may select matters in light of his
goal of furthering the interests of the local black community, for ex-
ample, and yet have no limitations on his independence that are not
internal or self-imposed. However, the commitment to a group of
people or to a community apart from specific clients may express itself
in a more structured way, with the effect of limiting the lawyer's
freedom. 2 Thus, the OEO-funded Neighborhood Legal Services pro-
grams are based on a "neighborhood concept," where the lawyer, even
though representing individual clients, is also conceived of as rep-
resenting the neighborhood. 3 Consistent with that concept, Congress
has required that the affected community be allowed to participate in
the administration of OEO programs; most legal services programs
comply by placing community people on the board of trustees or on an
advisory committee. 04 While the powers of the advisory committees
vary both in theory and in practice, their role is usually in the area of
defining basic guidelines for client selection, an area of great impor-
tance given the need for some limitations on the caseload. Thus the
lawyer is made responsive to the community's perception of priorities
in providing limited legal services to community residents.
Mary Beth Halloran of the Washington, D.C., Neighborhood Legal
Services Project says that her organization has been "very independent
from our board of directors, with the exception of a policy change last
year." In that policy change, the lay board voted to have the office take
domestic relations cases. The lawyers had opposed this because they
didn't think that domestic relations was a key area of law reform and
because, without any increase in staff, domestic relations cases are a
large burden on the limited resources of the office. However, "at the
same time, we were committed to serving the community and couldn't
do anything but accept the community view, even though it may be
the quickest way to dilute our effort."05
92. There may be "constituencies" other than those mentioned in the text which act
to restrict what the lawyer does. Most of the traditional legal aid societies are run by
local bar associations. This may lead to a soft-pedaling of controversial matters, or an
avoidance of those client relationships that are likely to give rise to controversial Issues,
with the consequent sacrifice of clients' (or potential clients') interests. Government or
foundation funding may come with rigorous restrictions on clients to be represented.
See pp. 1109-15 supra.
93. See Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for lit
Poor, 80 HARV. L. REv. 805,805-10 (1967).
94. See generally id. at 828-33.
95. A different experience with community boards is described by Carol Ruth Silver,
Imminent Failure of Legal Service for the Poor: Why and How to Limit the Caseload,
46 JouRNAL or UrwAN LAW 217 (1968). She found that domestic relations cases were
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The caseload policies of ORLA are set by its Board of Directors,
which includes many client representatives, and by local advisory com-
mittees, which are made up entirely of poor people. Usually employ-
ment and discrimination cases are at the top of the priority list, con-
sumer cases next, and domestic relations cases at the bottom. Recently,
many pesticide cases have been handled because farm workers on the
advisory committees had stated in no uncertain terms that pesticides
were the number one danger facing farm workers.00 As between the
central Board of Directors and the advisory committees, the latter are
emerging as the more important force. Their structure and composi-
tion are still fluid, and the extent of their powers depends upon
how much they can effectively demand. One controversy described by
Jim Lorenz highlights the difficult questions involved in determining
the proper allocation of power between the lawyer-professionals and
the lay community representatives:
Some of the advisory committees have claimed the power to hire
and fire attorneys. This raises some difficult questions. Are laymen
on the advisory committees competent to judge the capability of
a lawyer, especially regarding his handling a large number of cases
which do not involve them as plaintiffs? Should the decision of
hiring a lawyer be left to eight or ten "representatives" of a com-
munity sitting on an advisory board, when three or four hundred
other people may be represented by the law office, and be affected
by what the attorney does? If the advisory committee representa-
tives are the best judges of whether the lawyer gets along well with
the community, aren't staff lawyers still the best judges of his
professional ability? What the ORLA attorneys and advisory com-
mittees have finally agreed to is that the advisory committees will
assigned low priority, and that the highest priority was given to legal efforts directed
at institutional change and law reform, or on behalf of client groups. See also Calm &
Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARV. L. Rsi. 929, 987-90 (1968). The Calms
argue that in evaluating the contribution poor people can make to the running of
programs which affect them, a distinction must be made between poor people in roles
as clients and in roles as planners for a poor community. The Cahns arsert that whengiven roles as community planners, poor people are able to see beyond Elhort.term wants
to the larger long-term needs of the community.
96. Jim Lorenz gives an illustration of how intense is the community's interest in
CRLA priorities, and how community groups may make themselves heard in the
policymaking process:
This program has always been more oriented to Mexican-American farm workers
than to any other group, even though there are many other kinds of people in
rural areas. The lawyers have had a great deal to do with who the client groups
were. In Modesto, the Okies thought they were being under-represented and sat in
twice in our office. As a result they got an Okie community workcr, more Seats on
the board, and a lawyer to work with them full time. Our emphasis on Mexican-
Americans was because they were the best organized group in rural areas, a response
to power groupings.
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be consulted before directing attorneys (the head attorney in each
of the nine regional legal services offices) are hired97
3. Lawyers Without Clients
As already mentioned, some lawyers who bring class actions name
plaintiffs who in no way control the law suit. These plaintiff-clients
serve only to get the lawyer into court-for all practical purposes the
lawyer has no specific client, and the law suit is his. Other public in-
terest lawyers, who have made their battleground outside the court-
house, are engaged in work where the formality of having specific
clients is not required. Such lawyers pursue a "cause" or the general
interests of a large and diffuse constituency without the ambivalence
of being tied to specific clients with particular needs. There is no
specific client to invoke the lawyer's services, no specific client to
structure the lawyer's time. The concept of the "client" has been trans-
formed, and with it the dependence of the lawyer.
Marian Wright Edelman's Washington Research Project well illus-
trates the phenomenon. While the Project occasionally represents
specific clients, most of the work is not of that type. In its research
projects and political work in Washington, the Project sees itself as
furthering the interests not of specific clients but of a constituency
composed of poor blacks in the rural South. Obviously, such a con-
stituency cannot exercise the close direction and supervision character-
istic of the traditional client. Edelman accepts in theory that the
lawyer must be responsive and accountable to his constituency: "Our
basic thesis is accountability, both at the government level and else-
where. We can't be any different." But although Edelman is one of the
few voices rural Southern blacks have in Washington, she is not their
elected representative; she cannot be recalled; there is no formal pro-
cess of accountability.
While on the one hand Edelman is attempting to organize her con-
stituency,98 she at the same time faces the immediate burden of fairly
representing its views. Ironically, while Edelman came to Washington
because of a perceived need to give Southern blacks a voice there, her
location increases the danger that she will become isolated and out of
97. Lorenz adds:
The resolution was not propounded unilaterally by attorneys who said, "Wouldn't
it be nice if the people of the community had more say-so in hiring." This resolu-
tion was the result of very hard bargaining between staff attorneys and members
of the community-which shouldn't surprise anybody. A healthy decislonmaking
process is not characterized by continual consensus, but by a good deal of pushing
and pulling.
98. See pp. 1083-84 supra.
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touch; there is also the chance, as Edelman puts it, of "spending so
much time with bureaucrats that I become more 'reasonable' and more
'negotiable.'" A classic example of the need for close contact between
a lawyer and his claimed constituency is the problem of representing
Southern blacks on the schools problem:
We are up here filing desegregation suits, but something else is
going on in the black community. I sensed it before I left Missis-
sippi. We hear more about non-desegregation, about "our" schools,
about money to build up black schools. I'm not sure we are doing
the right thing in the long run. We automatically assume that
what we need to do is close lousy black schools. But desegrega-
tion is taking the best black teachers out of the black schools and
putting lousy white teachers in black schools. It has become a
very complex thing. We'd be in a much better position if I took
off for 2-3 months to go down South and just talk to people, about
what they want in education policy. I don't think we can do any-
thing with Title I until we find out what they really want.03
In practice, the substance of accountability is difficult to achieve-
even assuming a genuine commitment to it. The difficulty with the
constituency Edelman has adopted is that it is so large, so diffuse and
so unorganized. Part of what Edelman is doing, in fact, is organizing
her constituency, creating and bolstering groups to which she can be
responsive-in a sense, organizing to limit her independence. The
Washington Research Project's newsletter is designed to transmit in-
formation to community groups and to build up a network of contacts.
But for now, the constituency exists chiefly in the minds of the Proj-
ect's lawyers. Edelman says: "I think the way we handle our guilt
feelings about the theoretical, technical nature of the constituency is
by making ourself responsive." But how is that to be done? Trips to
the South, visits from southern blacks, and an affiliation with Atlanta's
Clark College are all devices to keep in touch with what is happening
outside of Washington in local communities, but obviously small ones;
greater efforts along this line would be expensive and time-consuming.
Finally, Edelman is very much independent; although straining to be
responsive, she is in no way restrained by any formal democratizing
mechanism. In speaking for others she inevitably will be speaking her
99. She is aware of the implications of this idea of responsiveness:
Poor parents turn out to be very conservative. You find out they say, "I uant my
kid to be able to read, to count, etc." We have been talking about all kinds of
fancy enrichment things that they couldn't care very much about. I think that we
are being less than honest if we form our policy in a vacuum.
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own sense of what must be done to achieve social justice for Southern
blacks.
One of the most independent of the lawyers we interviewed is Ralph
Nader. With no specific clients and no clearly defined constituency
beyond that of all of us in our roles as consumer, 10 Nader is free from
outside control in the selection of matters to handle as well as positions
to take on the matters he selects. He is, in some sense, his own client and
constituency. But he is not particularly troubled by the implications of
his independence because he believes that most of his activities thus
far do not involve serious allocation and priority questions. "We're at
such a primitive level now, fighting dirty food, seeking procedural re-
form like the Freedom of Information Act, that the decisions are easy
to make." To the suggestion that attacking General Motors on safety
and pollution issues might raise the cost of cars to poor people, Nader
responded that he does consider the external effects of his activities,
but that, for example, poor people rarely buy new cars anyway. Beyond
such rationalizations, however, the justification for his independence
lies in Nader's belief that the lawyer is properly a social engineer.
Yet while Nader is perfectly free to take any position on any issue,
the consuming public does have a degree of control over the power
which he wields. As he suggests, his visibility invites public attack by
critics who dispute his view of the public interest; the wide support
he is presumed to have will slip away if he blunders.
The best check on the honesty of public interest lawyers is their
insecurity of role. To be secure they must perpetuate their ideal
mission; they have no bureaucracy. If they're dishonest or let the
public down, they lose whatever impact they might have. If I make
a mistake, if I charge General Motors falsely, I lose credibility.
This form of accountability is seen as a definite check by another ob-
server of Nader's activities, Stephen Rosenfeld of the Boston Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law:
I think Nader's type of accountability is probably the most
rigorous of all, a continuing one, since he has become the ac-
cepted spokesman for the consumer nationally. He is constantly
being judged by a lot of people, and his ability to articulate their
needs, littleness, powerlessness, and to translate that into some kind
of action accurately reflecting their concern, will determine
whether or not he will be retained as their spokesman. That is
100. From the quality of his actions (attacking automotive and small airplane safety,
quality in baby food, and hot dogs), it might be said that Nader defines the consumer
interest from a middle class perspective.
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a very tenuous kind of retainer. Once Nader takes a wrong turn-
as judged by consumer groups-the retainer is lost. Part of the
marvel of the man is that he has retained such a large constituency
and is accountable to them.
B. Independence and Accountability
In the preceding pages, we have attempted to sketch the origins and
extent of the public interest lawyer's freedom from the traditional
limitations of the lawyer-client relationship. The clear import of
this newly found independence is a greater reliance on the lawyer's
personal values; public interest lawyers are continually and willingly
thrown back upon their own sense of what is important for society.
The difficult question, which we now address, is the extent to which
this independence is a good thing; or, to put the question differently,
to what extent the lawyer should look outside himself-to the poor
community, to consumers, to environmentalists, or to the radical po-
litical community he serves-for perspective and control.
In representing a specific client-whether an individual or an orga-
nized group-the lawyer's obligation is clearly set by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.' 01 The lawyer should inform the client
of every alternative open to him, and explain the probable conse-
quences of each alternative; the choice among possible courses of action
is then the client's, and the lawyer must pursue the chosen course with
dedication. We found nothing in our study to suggest that the lawyers
we interviewed do not conform to this rule. But our statement of the
rule leaves open an important question: How far, and for what pur-
poses, is the lawyer justified in using his powers of persuasion to in-
fluence the client's choice? This question is an important one not only
with respect to public interest lawyers; it is debated even more hotly
with respect to private lawyers advising business clients where public
interests are seen to be at stake.
Two important observations peculiar to public interest law are jus-
tified. First, when the client is poor or unsophisticated, the lawyer's
ability to manipulate him to serve the lawyer's personal values or am-
bitions is increased. It is hardly necessary to point out that such "rep-
resentation" would be a cruel hoax, and that the lawyer in these
circumstances should carefully examine his own motives and defend
to the client the true purposes of his persuasion. Second, when the
lawyer's acknowledged job is to provide legal representation to a con-
101. ABA CODE OF PROF.SSIONAL REsPoNsmLry, Canon 7. See especially § EC 7-8
(Final Draft 1969).
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stituency or community, as with some legal services organizations and
a few other firms, the lawyer may be justified in using strong persuasion
upon the client to adopt that course which best serves needs of the
community as a whole, even to the point of refusing to handle the
client's case unless he agrees to adopt a particular strategy. The reason
for this conclusion is that lawyers available to meet the needs of a poor
community are scarce, and their time is best allocated to handle mat-
ters in ways that are likely to have the greatest impact on that com-
munity. A poor person should certainly be entitled to the services of
an attorney to handle his individual needs, but it does not follow
from this proposition that a lawyer whose acknowledged commitment
is to a larger community should be charged with the burden of meeting
all those individual needs. Similarly, it should be perfectly acceptable
for the lawyer to solicit a nominal client in order to get a case into
court; where cases are designed to affect the community as a whole, it
makes no sense to require the lawyer to wait for a "suitable plaintiff"
to appear unsolicited.
Somewhat different problems are raised by the lawyer's freedom to
select matters to handle. At issue is the allocation of legal services
among deserving clients or causes; since legal resources are limited, a
lawyer's decision to serve one client or one cause may mean that
another goes unrepresented.
Traditionally, lawyers have chosen to allocate their time primarily
according to the market. When a lawyer repudiates a criterion of client
selection which depends upon the client's ability to pay-as have the
lawyers we interviewed-he must use some different method. The
method he elects to use can range from one which allows him no
freedom whatever to select cases or clients, to one which amounts to
nothing more than following his whim of the moment. Our purpose
here is not to discuss the lawyer's freedom to elect a method of allocating
his time, but rather to evaluate particular methods which may allow
a lawyer the freedom to choose cases according to his own goals and
values. 102
Though there are a great variety of checks and controls the lawyer
may adopt in his selection of cases, the issues are focused most clearly
by comparing two models: "independence" and "community control."
102. We discussed earlier, pp. 1105 ff. supra, the limitations on client selection
imposed by the public interest lawyer's source of funding. Where such limitations
exist, the lawyer's freedom to select cases is to that extent curtailed. Moreover, the
freedom of the lawyer to choose his clients and the freedom of the government or
foundation to decide what clients a lawyer it funds will represent are identical for
the purposes of our present discussion.
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The "independent" lawyer relies solely on personal values and his own
sense of what is important. Monroe Freedman, director of the Philip
Stem Community Law Office in Washington, justified the indepen-
dence model, arguing that lawyers totally released from external con-
straints serve a highly useful social purpose: they provide a perspective
on the legal process and social change which cannot be achieved by
those concerned with their own immediate problems.
I do not mean to say that people in the community, groups in
the community, don't know what they want or are not entitled to
have representation on what they want or think they want. I am
saying that there is a place for lawyers who don't serve that func-
tion. It's in part a matter of expertise and values and of the public
not knowing what they're going to need in the future. I'll use a
dirty word. It's very elitist, and although I'm a very strong be-
liever in participatory democracy, it doesn't prevent me from
being an elitist.103
Set against the "independence" model is the "community control"
model, which subordinates the lawyer's decisions on cases to handle
to control by those whose interests are at stake in his work. This model
is usually implemented by a board composed of true representatives of
the constituency-rather than lawyers or inveterate board sitters--who
have effective power to control the lawyer's allocation decisions. The
contemporary movement for decentralization and democratization of
institutions urges that people are the best judges of their own best
interests and ought to participate in decisions which affect their lives
-and thus it supports the notion that the lawyer should be account-
able to those he serves. Since lawyers for the underrepresented are by
definition scarce, a lawyer's decision to handle one kind of case rather
than another is also a decision setting priorities in the community's
legal representation. The "community control" model asserts that
those decisions are properly the people's.
The two models are true alternatives where-as in Neighborhood
Legal Services-the question is how best to serve the interests of a
poor community. Here there exists a group which is able, through
representatives, to exercise control over the lawyer; yet the lawyer can
also, while still claiming to serve the group's best interests, be inde-
103. While Freedman's independent and relatively secure source of funds gives him
great freedom to pursue whatever causes he pleases, his operation reflects an acceptance
of the idea that several voices in the setting of priorities are better than one. In the
brief existence of the firm, Freedman has found that his seven-man Board of Directors,
including four representatives of Reverend Channing Phillips' church in Washington,
provides "real guidance."
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pendent of it in allocating his services among various types of cases.
The dilemma is well focused: who should decide how to allocate the
community's legal resources, the lawyer or the community?
The justification for independence in this situation is paternalistic:
the lawyer is properly a social engineer, deciding what is really im-
portant for a community or constituency, because he is skilled, rational,
and benevolent. Independence allows rational action and the use of
expertise free from the need to spend energy and time dealing with
people who may be uneducated, prone to irrationality, unaware of
their best interests, and difficult to organize. But this notion of benev-
olent expertise is undercut by the community's conflicting claim of
"expertise" in matters which concern it, and by the danger that, in
following his own instincts, the lawyer may be misled by the limita-
tions of his perspective, and mistake personal interests for those of
the group on whose behalf he speaks. Thus the lawyer's personal in-
terest in furthering his career or his organization, or in amusing him-
self, and the limitations of his perspective because of his class and
racial background, may undermine the goals to which he professes
devotion.
No one really knows which of these models will produce "better"
decisions, nor is there agreement on what "better" means.1 4 Given
what have been publicized as failures of expertise in the country's re-
cent history, however, and given the demoralizing powerlessness so
many citizens feel today, the arguments seem stronger in the direction
of community control; where there is popular participation, decisions
are at least likely to be perceived as more "legitimate," and, even
should there be increased in-fighting among groups, community or-
ganization is likely to be furthered.lo 5 This is not to say that lawyers
whose selection of cases is not controlled by the community are some-
how illegitimate advocates of the underrepresented. They may be
handling matters affecting the community to which no other lawyer
is giving consideration; and they may even be handling matters which
they perceive are the most important for the community. But where
a lawyer, a foundation, or a program administrator is faced with the
choice between the independence and community control models of
104. See, e.g., pp. 1075-91 supra.
105. It should be remembered that the "community control" model can be expensiva
to apply, requiring as it does time, energy, and even money if it is to work. And ag
community control increasingly comes to be justified by different people on differing
grounds-it is smart politics, it will give the participants a benefidal feeling of control
,over their lives, it will produce "better" decisions-it becomes a concept which has
imprecise connotations and which may raise false expectations when championed.
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service, we can favor the latter, insisting that only it will offer the poor
more than "expert"--though presumably benevolent-manipulation
of their future.
The community control model is not a realistic possibility for law-
yers who choose to represent interests not associated with a defined
community. Nevertheless, the problem of scarce resources for repre-
senting these interests suggests the appropriateness of limitations upon
the independence model of choosing cases and setting priorities. Quite
apart from the contending claims of expertise and lay wisdom is a dis-
trust of individual arrogance, presumably shared by experts and the
laity. Thus, for lawyers working in the environment or consumer areas,
where a constituency or community is hard to pinpoint although it is
somewhere "out there," an advisory board may be useful to suggest the
most important and pressing areas for legal attack. Formal devices such
as advisory boards are not, of course, necessary for the lawyers to re-
main responsive; informal consultation may be just as effective when
the lawyers are genuinely committed to seeking guidance beyond the
limits of their own perspectives. Working relationships or frequent
consultation with organized community or citizens' groups have been
found particularly useful. According to Charles Halpern of the Center
for Law and Social Policy, "We are learning fairly fast that interaction
with conservation groups of various kinds is very important. They do
help to define cases you get into, and their sense of priorities affects
our sense of priorities."
An additional step seems important because there is another possible
ground for criticism of the independent lawyer: he may select cases on
such a personal, unarticulated basis that he will be acting without a
dear sense of direction. To the extent that the lawyer makes com-
pletely ad hoc decisions in selecting cases, his ability to achieve sig-
nificant, lasting change is likely to be small because his efforts will not
be programatic. While this relative powerlessness is a safeguard
against abuse of independent power, it is hardly an efficient use of
limited funds and lawyer time. In addition, without clearly defined
goals, the lawyer's operation may be difficult to evaluate-difficult for
the lawyer and for others. Thus, a prior articulation by the lawyer of
his goals and his strategy for implementing them would be useful as
a focus both for the lawyer's activity and for outside evaluation, a
standard by which to assess specific decisions and to measure deflections
from the proclaimed goals.
A new dimension is added to the problem of the lawyer's inde-
pendence when his work allows him not only to select matters to
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handle, but also to select positions to take on particular issues.100 The
tensions present are illustrated in the work of Ralph Nader of the
Center for the Study of Responsive Law and Marian Edelman of the
Washington Research Project. Both spend much of their time seeking
to influence Congressional and agency policy as it affects underrepre-
sented interests in society, and each is largely free from control by
those on whose behalf he speaks.
With regard to the selection of positions to take, there is an argu-
ment for "independence" aside from that of expertise: the maverick
introduces new ideas and fresh perspectives into the political system;
he ensures flexibility in the political process; and, indeed, today's
novel idea may become the focus of tomorrow's consensus. But Ralph
Nader and Marian Edelman are not simply offering their own ideas
for consideration: they wield power. Regardless of how Edelman thinks
of herself, she is often looked to as the voice of black Southerners on
particular issues, and what she says carries weight because she is a
powerful negotiator and is perceived as controlling political clout. Her
position is thus to a great extent perceived and acted upon as the posi-
tion of black Southerners. The tension between the "independence"
and "community control" models is present here as well.
The dilemma may be muted, if not resolved, by practical considera-
tions, much the same ones that provide the basis for recent criticism
of "pluralist politics" itself. The diffuseness and indeterminateness of
Edelman's or Nader's constituency, and its lack of organization, make
any formal democratizing mechanism impossible. To require a lawyer
like Edelman to be genuinely "accountable" is in effect to tell her
either to act simply as a conduit for scattered local groups (who need
funding grants or who have specific complaints) or to work locally, to
organize poor blacks; it is to deny a place in Washington to anyone
who wields power with the best interests of poor black people in mind.
To require a lawyer like Nader to be genuinely accountable is to tell
him what-to be voted on by all consumers? Too rigid a requirement
of an organized constituency for public interest lawyers discounts one
of the major weaknesses of the pluralistic model: the treatment of
matters of principle (everyone must be fed and clothed) as matters of
106. The freedom to select positions is present to a certain extent in the selection
of clients: if opposing community groups are struggling for mutually exclusive plang
in a Model Cities program, for example, a lawyer's decision to represent one group is a
choice of positions as well. But the questions about that freedom are raised most
seriously where the lawyer's activities do not involve primarily the representation of
clients.
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interest (we, hungry and unclad, demand food and clothing). Such a
model leaves no opportunity for the articulation of either "community
values" or of new values with as yet unorganized constituencies.
Black people may from time to time be divided on some issues, and
Edelman may favor "integrationist" policies over "separatist" ones.
But she is one of the few people in Washington totally committed to
the interests of black people. As the allocation implications of decisions
become more complex, the "consumer interest" may become less dear,
and Ralph Nader may use his power to push for a mandatory auto
safety device when many consumers would prefer a cheaper car. But
he is one of the few people in Washington totally committed to the
interests of the consumer. Both he and Edelman at least try to force
others to throw into the balance a set of considerations that would
otherwise be ignored. A rigid accountability requirement, though in
the name of more honest and complete representation, would for the
time being deprive any voice to unorganized interests, and thereby
would not even let the stage be set for debate about what is indeed best
for those interests.
As a matter of priorities we might criticize a diversion of resources
from "accountable" lawyers to "independent" professionals. And, in
the long run, for reasons of "legitimacy" and for the reason that the
achievement of social change requires far more than the activity of
lawyers, we may want a society where citizens are effectively repre-
sented not by self-appointed lawyers but by their own organizations
which are able to retain and control lawyers. But today's maverick
voice should be heard, and the crusader respected, if only because un-
organized interests have no more practical alternative. Consistent with
the participation model, of course, one can urge these lawyers to be as
responsive as possible to the people they "represent" and affect. One
can also demand that they keep a steady sense of direction. And, finally,
if one looks for lasting change, and change on other than a piecemeal
basis, one can hope that others will work to organize the poor and
other underrepresented interests so that those groups can become social
forces in their own right.
IV. Life and Working Styles
The growth of new political consciousness in the sixties contributed
to the development of T-groups, Women's Liberation, Communes, and
other experiments in the search for a personally fulfilling way of life.
The attempt to strike a satisfying balance between the demands of the
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craft, societal concerns, and personal needs has been an important
determinant in the occupational choices of the lawyers we interviewed.
The adoption of new life styles seems to have proved particularly dif-
ficult for them, perhaps because something in the nature of legal prac-
tice itself imposes a pattern on one's entire life, or at least blocks the
integration of one's personal life with an aggressive professional role. 01
Many of the lawyers we interviewed were refugees from the life
patterns of private corporate firms. Few doubted that the atmosphere
and regimen of such firms provide the stimulus for the acquisition of
a high level of professional expertise and craftsmanship. John Flym
reflected:
I spent four years with a large firm and I worked for all the
wrong clients. It was useful in some respects. You dedicate your-
self to a concept of craftsmanship; craftsmanship becomes all. You
do what law school tells you that you are supposed to do, which is
to take either side of any issue. You focus on how to do whatever
you are told to do, and don't worry about what it is you are doing.
You learn to do it very well.'08
But the same atmosphere which fosters technical competence is also
perceived by the public interest lawyers as involving great costs. For
example, many of the lawyers we interviewed emphasized the inherent
"friction" in the competitive hierarchical relationships found in a large
firm, and complained that such firms are dehumanizing. One of the
lawyers was particularly disturbed by the impersonality and cautious-
ness'00 of his colleagues at the corporate firm where he once practiced:
107. Of the many commentaries on the effects of practicing law on the practitioner,
perhaps one excels for its insight:
But the lawyer is always in a hurry .... He is a servant and is continually disputing
about a fellow-servant before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his
hands; the trial is never about some indifferent matter but always concerns himself;
and often the race is for his life. The consequence has been, that he has become
keen and shrewd; he has learned how to flatter his master in work and indulge
him in deed; but his soul is small and unrighteous . I . . fFlrom the first he has
practiced deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so
he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness in him; and Is
now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is the lawyer, Theodorus . . . .-- Plato
as cited in M. MAYER, THE LAwYERs 4 (1966).
108. Flym, however, is far from convinced that equivalent tednical expertise could
not be gained independently.
I certainly feel that I have grown more and more rapidly, since I left the firm. I
really don't feel that you need to have the big firm experience. You can develop
your expertise independently more rapidly on your own than inside the large firm.
109. This is not a new complaint. See, e.g., C. DIcKENs, BLEAK House, ch. 39 (1853):
Mr. Vholes is a very respectable man. He has not a large business, but he is a very
respectable man. He is allowed by the greater attorneys who have made good for.
tunes, or are making them, to be a most respectable man. He never misscs a chance
in his practice; which is another mark of respectability. He never takes any pleasure;
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Most of the things that we felt strongly, if we felt anything
strongly, we did not express to each other. There were no deep re-
lationships among most of our people. One partner committed
suicide about three years ago. Everyone was shocked. The state-
ment given was "Gee, I didn't realize he was unhappy or had any
personal problems."
Even those lawyers who found the atmosphere of the corporate firm
amenable on a personal level discovered shortcomings in the work op-
portunities of such firms. Michael Schneiderman practiced at Arnold
and Porter for two and a half years in general corporate work. Although
he found the firm to be "an extremely civilized place," with a relatively
generous policy on pro bono work, Schneiderman felt "trapped into
situations where, although there were some opportunities for public
interest work, they were basically insufficient." He also "felt confined
by the firm's policy about conflicts of interest, which was also relatively
liberal, but not liberal enough for me." Tony Roisman of Berlin,
Roisman 8c Kessler summarized the personal difficulties in the part-
time pro bono work possible at the large private firms:
You have to be able to immerse yourself in the problems of your
clients, to see the thing from their standpoint, and not be bothered
by the fact that the pile on one side of the desk represents money-
making, amoral work, and that the pile on the other side repre-
sents non-money-making work that you feel committed to do. It
doesn't work to do it that way, either emotionally or in terms of
the quality of service provided.
Most important, many of the lawyers reacted against the use of tech-
nical competence divorced from any concept of personal responsibility
for the effects of one's work. As Flym noted, "the corporate lawyer
today is someone who does his job within the four corners of an insti-
tution. There is a sharp dichotomy between his professional work and
his personal values."
The structure of the new public interest law firms tends to reflect
the reaction against practice in the large corporate firms or govern-
ment agencies from which many of them have come. Virtually all firms
emphasize the independence of the individual lawyer. For example,
Marian Wright Edelman describes the Washington Research Project
as being an "unstructured structure":
which is another mark of respectability. He is reserved and serious; which is an.
other mark of respectability. His digestion is impaired, which is highly respectable.
And he is making hay of the grass which is flesh, for his three daughters.
Compare E. SMIGEL, Ta WALL ST-E r LAwYER (1964).
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We have gone after people who are independently good, who can
run their own thing. We do not interfere in each other's stuff. We
don't have a "boss" relationship. We hire people who are good;
we ask them what they want to do, tell them what we need, and
then let them go to work.
Another sign of reaction to the corporate law firm experience is that
most of the new organizations tend to be small, generally composed of
fewer than ten lawyers who relate as equals. Such equality is occasion-
ally expressed in communal decision-making and financial arrange-
ments. In the Law Commune, for example, decisions on which major
political cases to handle are made jointly by the entire staff, including
secretaries. In both Berlin, Roisman & Kessler and the Commune, all
money received is divided according to need, or equally beyond need.
A further indication of "liberation" among the lawyers we inter-
viewed was that all had, to some degree, abandoned the traditional
criterion of financial reward as the measurement of professional success
and as a primary source of personal gratification.11 0 Although many of
the lawyers lived very comfortably, all had accepted distinct limitations
on their immediate salary potential.' As Tony Roisman indicated,
other types of compensation replace wealth:
We think that the public interest area is such that you are not
rewarded by making money. You are compensated by sleeping
better, and by really enjoying what you are doing. I look forward
to coming into the office in the morning and I only leave it at
night because I get so hungry that I can't stand it any longer. We
really enjoy everything that we do. I think it's called psychic in-
come.
Others pointed to different external rewards-publicity, hobnobbing
110. "Sufficient" financial remuneration was still, however, an essential prerequisite
for most of the lawyers Interviewed. For many, "sufficiency" wvas often a very comfortable
income. An interesting example of this requirement wvas recounted by Ralphi Nader. III
a lecture at Harvard Law School, Nader asked the audience how many were interested
in public interest law. About 90% of the audience stood up. He then asked how many
would be interested if the salary were $12,000 per year; a few sat down. At 10,000, 8,000,
and 7,000 increasing numbers sat down. By the time he reached $4,000, two students
remained standing. "That's right, gentlemen," Nader sneered, "your convictions are
entirely a matter of price."
111. The lawyers who received the highest salaries were those connected with
foundation-funded Washington operations (Ralph Nader is the exception). The Washing-
ton lawyers, plus the older members of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and some of
the conservation people were also those who had made the least break with the tradl.
tional style of the corporate lawyer. Moreover, the limitations on the salary potential of
all of the lawyers interviewed only apply as long as they remain in public interest firms.
For many, a return to a more remunerative traditional practice was not unforeseeable,
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with Congressmen, meeting celebrities."- Ann Garfinkle of the Law
Commune observed that with financial success removed as a measure
of achievement, status came from handling "sexy" cases with large at-
tendant publicity. According to Garfinkle, the women attorneys in the
Commune were initially not receiving any of these cases. Only after
threats of a women's revolt were the cases more evenly distributed.
But despite these conscious choices of working relationships, firm
structure, firm size, and the nature of compensation, the lawyers ac-
cepted distinct limitations upon their life styles. For many, the decision
to work on matters which they valued was a personal political event.
Once having made their choice, they felt pressure to measure up to
corporate practice standards of professionalism." 3
The sensitivity about technical competence has caused most of the
lawyers we interviewed to view their professional role as requiring
long, diligent labor. For the dedicated, the demands upon their time
and energy were so great that their personal lives generally suffered.
As Gary Bellow noted about his CRLA experience, "the work load is
inconceivable.... The sheer absolute work is incredible." For Ralph
Nader, the emphasis on competence combines with a missionary zeal
to create a life of ascetic self-denial. For members of the Commune it
results in devotion to legal work often to the exclusion of other polit-
ical activities.
The crux of the public interest lawyer's dilemma in finding a satis-
factory working role is this: his desires for an integrated, humane
personal life, both on the job and off, conflict, perhaps irresolvably,
with his commitment to clients in whom he believes. On the one hand,
the disparity in legal services available to his clients is such, and
his commitment to his clients so strong, that he feels driven to work
112. On the entire question, Edgar Cahn, a wratchful critic of his colleagues, noted
that:
There is a form of private profiteering going on in public interest law. [We] would
get our kicks out of doing good and being saviors and acting like the elitist gov-
ernors of our society, and then in favoring ourselves and holding conferences, and
getting very interesting fringe benefits. I'm not prepared to say that everybody In
poverty law has taken a vow of ultra penury. I haven't and I don't pretend to have.
I think there is a hypocrisy in this claim of purity which I haven't seen lived up
to, and I see no intention of being lived up to, by those who go into poverty law.
11s. Similarly, exiles often establish what Stanley Diamond has called "an exilarchy,
a sort of hereditary rule in the place of exile, recapitulating the culture of the past So
far as that is possible, while drawing strength from the mythos of persecution."
Diamond, The Old School at the New School, Nmw YoRK RLvIE oF Boorts, June 18,
1970. The lawryers interviewed frequently recreate the atmosphere and demands of
the corporate firm, while drawing strength from the mythos of personal sacrifice for the
sake of good causes.
1141
The Yale Law Journal
spartan hours and to be as efficient as possible in his work. On the other
hand, complete efficiency and self-denial would lead to the very de-
humanization and lack of personal expression and fulfillment which
these lawyers rebelled against when they left private practice and gov-
ernment service.
No doubt the underrepresented deserve lawyers who are as proficient
and dedicated as those who labor for corporations. No doubt any con-
cept of professional responsibility implies the acquisition of a degree
of technical competence. But as some of the more perceptive lawyers
noted, over-dedicated poverty lawyers tend to exhaust their commit-
ment in a relatively short while. Dennis Roberts, Reginald Heber
Smith Fellow with Oakland Legal Services, worked for two years with
C.B. King in Albany, Georgia. He described that job as being very
necessary, but as involving terrible working conditions, subsistence
pay, and fifteen to twenty hour work days. Although he is pleased to
have had the experience, Roberts felt that the pace was too hectic for
a long-range commitment. The feverish work of such lawyers is often
neurotic; as Roberts put it, "you work like hell because you feel
guilty that you are a well-off white." Too heavy a work load puts un-
bearable stress on interpersonal relationships and decreases the lawyer's
ability to do quality work for the client. Undoubtedly some poverty
lawyers view their role as a routine nine-to-five job, enjoying what
Edgar Cahn harshly calls "a position of secured indulgence for the
self-anointed." But for others, a forty hour week may be a necessary
element in an attempt to establish a life pattern conducive to long-
range commitment.
A traditional working style may be counter-productive for public
interest lawyers in the short run as in the long run. The tension be-
tween professional accomplishment and the need for personal expres-
sion and satisfaction is symbolized in the frequent debate over dress and
appearance. For most public interest lawyers, style is at present sec-
ondary to effectiveness. Ralph Nader, who looks like the archetypal
college student of the fifties (sans letter sweater), expressed a strong
distaste for reformers who hurt their cause by indulging in "vanities
and symbols," including long hair, beads and rhetoric, all of which
"flout the aesthetic sensibilities of the masses." Most of the lawyers
we interviewed felt that they had to dress and act "straight" to solicit
funds effectively and to be successful in the forums where their client's
rights would be decided.
But if public interest lawyers are to live truly integrated lives, then
the medium may indeed have to become one with the message. Fred
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Cohn of the Law Commune, a bearlike man who combines a Mailer-
esque head of hair with a bushy black mustache, felt that his appear-
ance was beneficial to his clients both because it identified him with
his client in the courtroom, thus providing the client with a powerful
and articulate spokesman, and because it was part of the message which
both he and his client were trying to spread. Jim Lorenz noted, on the
basis of his CRLA experience, that an increasing number of the better
young lawyers feel that the way in which a lawyer dresses is a matter
of personal integrity and principle. This has direct implications for the
directors of public interest firms: "If we impose conditions of dress or
put rigid restrictions on their personal discretion or life style, what
calibre attorney will we be able to attract?" In sum, acting on principle
may not contribute to effectiveness within the current system, but if
part of the lawyer's goal is to change the system and the professional
role of the lawyer, he may preserve areas of independence, recognizing
that there are some matters which simply cannot be compromised.
Few lawyers have successfully reconciled the demands of their pro-
fessional craft and the dictates of their personal values. The failure to
achieve an integrated personal and professional life style often leads
to a tension between the lawyer's substantive goals and his professional
activities. Even those lawyers who profess a belief that an effective
agent for social change must first change himself find it difficult to
establish a satisfactory balance between professional responsibility and
efficiency on the one hand, and personal relationships and expression
on the other. Perhaps the best examples of lawyers struggling with
these problems were the two lawyers least convinced of the desirability
of legal work. George Johnson practices independently in New Haven.
Worried about working in a manner which reaffirms what he feels to
be an illegitimate legal order, Johnson justifies his legal role as one of
"'cushioning the fall of people who get trapped in the legal system."
He does not view his legal work as primary, and thus is not particularly
concerned about the professional disadvantages of working alone. He
practices law as a means of support, hoping eventually to work part-time
in criminal defense work and to spend the rest of his time "either or-
ganizing or freeing my wife to organize." By specializing in drug and
draft cases, Johnson has had general success in the law which he does
practice, but he candidly notes: "There is no question that I am not
going to be as good an attorney as I might have been."
Johnson has consciously chosen to work at a local level, because
"nothing is changing on the national scene in Washington except the
names of the people." He believes strongly that he must devote as
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much of his time as possible to radical political activity and to his
family life, changing himself and "freeing" his wife. A sign of this
emphasis was that he was one of the few lawyers we interviewed who
displayed no sign of the driving argumentative personality common to
successful law school graduates. Yet his attempt at achieving a balanced
life was still tentative; and he commented that he had "few definite
answers" about the best way to combine radical political activity with
the practice of the law.
John Flym of Flym, Zalkind and Silverglate, also viewed his role as
a lawyer as secondary:
I live with the people I represent. I represent very few people
who are not friends, to a greater or lesser degree. I participate in
their activities. My life style is different because I don't think of
myself as a lawyer at all. I am a human being. I have a skill, and
I spend my time doing things among people that I like.
Distressed at the trend toward centralization in the United States, Flym
also consciously chose to work on the local level, attempting to make
his life a personal statement of his views. Yet Flym expressed a pro-
found frustration. His dissatisfaction stemmed in part from his perspec.
tive on the legal system: "I consider the function that the legal system
performs to be basically a very evil one." It also derived from what he
views as the limitations of the lawyer's role: "There is not a hell of a
lot that you can do through the law in the way of fostering change."
These attitudes have produced a deep ambivalence in Flym about the
practice of law:
I have thought a great deal about my situation, and certainly I
think that the system is using me. I am lending myself to be used
by the system at the same time that I am letting myself be used
by the Panthers. What you do about that is hard to resolve. For
myself, I have decided that I want to practice law less and less, and
focus more and more on living the things that I believe. But I
have an expertise now, and it is hard to imagine what else I would
do. I would be far from candid if I told you that I wasn't troubled
by that question, and if someone asked me whether it was a good
idea to go to law school and become a lawyer, I would say "no"
unequivocally. I may stop practicing law and it may be soon, I
don't know. Maybe I'll become a poet ....
Johnson and Flym are perhaps unique within the reaches of our
study, but their experiences may be viewed as less idiosyncratic as more
lawyers attempt to reconcile their professional and personal goals. In
the future, increasing numbers of professionals will perhaps be un-
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satisfied with merely placing their traditional expertise at the service
of groups or causes which they believe in. Increasingly, lawyers strug-
gling to establish new roles in the legal profession will be driven to
question the basic assumptions and forms of the profession. Behind
the questioning will be the vision of a new kind of law, more humane
both for the people whose lives it orders and for its practitioners as
well.114
V. Conclusion
Throughout this Comment, we have used the term "public interest
lawyer" to describe a large and diverse group of practitioners engaged
in a broad range of activities. We believe that these lawyers occupy
a professional role which differs both from that of the commercial
lawyer, with his primarily profit-oriented practice, and from that
of the government lawyer or administrator, who is charged with
protecting the "public interest" but who does so without clients or
a real constituency. A precise definition of this role, and certainly
any evaluation of it, must be tentative at this time. The lawyers
we interviewed have for the most part been out of law school less
than ten years; with some exceptions, their firms have been in ex-
istence only a few years, and in some cases a few months. Although the
field is varied and rapidly changing, our discussion in the previous sec-
tions does allow us to identify the forces which have created the role
of public interest lawyers, to point out the most significant aspects of
that role, and to speculate upon where the public interest law move-
ment-to the extent that it can fairly be labeled a movement-is
headed.
The role of the new public interest lawyer is a response to two
major developments of recent years. First, the expansion of substantive
114. The lay advocacy movement is currently a focus of interest for those, both
within and without the public interest law movement, who are dissatisfied with the
self-complacency and ritual obsolescence of the legal profession. One force behind the
lay advocacy movement is purely practical-the desperate need to provide assistance,
by paraprofessionals if necessary, to potential clients who are left without counsel un-
der our present system of allocation. But another equally vital force behind the lay
advocacy movement is a discontent with the elitism of the profession, which is in turn
part of a wider movement within our culture to break down the artificial barriers
which separate one man from another. To many observers, the conscious and/or un-
conscious mystification practiced by lawyers on their clients is perceived as an act of
violence. A self-conscious existential decision to throw off the cloak of his profesional-
ism would mean the disappearance of the lawyer as we commonly know him and his
emergence as someone speaking in simple language, following understandable proce-
dures, and loving, not manipulating, his fellows. See generally . D. LALNo, Trz PoL-
Tics OF ExsraExNc (1967).
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and procedural guarantees, and the growth of organized and politically
sensitive groups of poor people and consumers, have made new
demands upon the legal process which are inadequately met by
lawyers in commercial practice or by government agencies.11" These
developments have coincided, not accidentally to be sure, with a
heightened political and social consciousness on the part of many
young lawyers, and an increased determination to integrate their
personal values and their professional work.11 6 Both these demands-
that of emerging interest groups for representation, and that of young
lawyers for personally fulfilling work-have contributed to the present
shape of public interest practice, but they are not necessarily com-
plementary. In some ways, they create a tension which underlies
most of the serious controversies within public interest law, and
they provide two different perspectives for evaluating the role of
public interest lawyers.
Public interest lawyers are significant first of all in the types of needs
they serve. The present day public interest lawyer feels that the old
style pro bono work, while admirable, is no longer adequate to
cope with the problems we face. Rather than devoting his energies
to the defense of the constitutional rights of individuals, he feels that
he must take more affirmative action and think in broader social,
economic, and political terms. The lawyers we interviewed are com-
mitted ultimately to causes, not clients. They believe that the nation's
most pressing problems cannot be attacked by professionals whose
role is passive until retained by a client with a "legal problem." At
the same time, many are unwilling to subject their professional efforts,
their sense of what is important for society and how best to achieve
it, to control by particular clients. Their efforts take on added signifi-
cance because the resources available to pursue causes of social justice
are limited; thus these lawyers are not only advocates in particular
causes, but also arbiters of social priorities.
Public interest lawyers are also significant because of the type of
representation they offer. In attacking broad problems and pursuing
long-term goals, public interest lawyers have engaged in a wide range
of strategies and activities, including litigation, counseling, lobbying,
research and investigation, use of propaganda and the press, mobilizing
115. Edgar and Jean Cahn refer to these increased demands on the legal proces5 as
the "Rights Explosion" and the "Grievance Explosion." Cahn & Cahn, Power to th
People or the Profession?-The Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1005, 1008-10 (1970).
116. See pp. 1119-20 supra.
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community demonstrations, and organizing citizen's lobbies and com-
munity groups. Though none of these activities is novel in itself, the
programatic use of various strategies and various forums by a single
lawyer or law firm in behalf of broad social causes has given new dimen-
sions to the notion of "legal representation.""17 As the services per-
formed by public interest lawyers for their client groups have become
more and more complex and far ranging, the increasing tendency has
been to see the lawyer as a political figure. Several of our interviewees
predicated that the next decade will see public interest lawyers attempt-
ing to enter the political arena directly, using their client groups as a
constituency on either national or local levels.128
In speculating about the future, we suggest that the most important
forces which will shape the role of the public interest lawyer are
(1) the growth of politically sensitive community organizations and
citizens' groups, and an accompanying demand that lawyers who rep-
resent the interests of these groups be accountable to them; (2) the
future availability of foundation and government funds, and the
success or failure of efforts to develop a public interest practice sup-
ported by client fees; and (3) the response of government and the
private bar to the needs which public interest lawyers are attempting
to serve.
The tension between the demands of the underrepresented and the
search by lawyers for personal fulfillment in their practice will be
most visible in the trend toward increased accountability. First, a
stricter notion of accountability may force out some of the public
interest lawyers currently representing economically or racially defined
client groups. For example, as blacks and other minority groups be-
come more politically conscious, they may demand minority group
lawyers to represent them. Lawyers of a different economic or racial
class, and those not rooted in the communities they represent (especially
the foundation-funded Washington lawyers), may come to be regarded
117. Labor lawyers in the thirties and forties helped to organize labor unions, but
lawyers have not until recently tried to organize communities. The trend tomard com-
munity participation by lawyers for the poor, in combination with the movement for
lay advocacy, may help to break down the barriers between professional and la)man,
and to remove the cloak of professionalism from much of the lawyers work.
118. Jim Lorenz suggested that the current batch of public interest lawyers may
increasingly shift their attention in the future to representing the middle class on con-
sumer and environmental issues, leaving the representation of minority groups to mi-
nority lawyers. He thinks that public interest law will lead into politics because at the
moment the necessary votes for middle class legislation cannot be mustered in Cali-
fornia. He cites David Brower's Friends of the Earth as a client group or constituency
which is going to support political candidates on the basis of their environmental vot-
ing record, and suggests that some public interest lawyers may themselves become can-
didates.
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with an increasing measure of distrust. Related to this development
may be a trend by more radical groups to demand lawyers who are
willing to lay down their professional status and role to "run with"
the group.
In the consumer protection area, time will put the Ralph Nader
model of the independent professional to a stringent test. The politics
of the public interest is sufficiently complex that Nader may be un-
able to continue to find issues which will generate immediate and
overwhelming support by consumers. Nader's latest crusade against
General Motors by proxy fight was certainly more controversial than
his fights against unsafe automobiles or rotten sides of beef. As the
focus shifts from manifest corporate irresponsibility to more difficult
issues of public policy, the public interest lawyer who was once able
to speak for all may find it necessary to actively seek support from
particular special interest groups; and in representing those groups
against others, he will become less independent.
As we have discussed at length, the continued availability of funds
to support public interest lawyers is a major unknown. This potential
source of trouble is noted not only by the public interest lawyers
themselves, but also by older lawyers, some of whom feel that the
"new" movement is part of a recurrent pattern in which they them-
selves have already played their part. To these older lawyers, many
of whom are veterans of the Roosevelt era, the brashness and idealism
of the new crop of public interest lawyers is in large measure the
product of a national affluence which may prove to be temporary.
While some of the current public interest lawyers continue to make the
financial and personal sacrifices traditionally associated with such work,
some-particularly those whose firms are foundation-funded-are
able to have the satisfaction of serving the underrepresented and of
receiving very handsome remuneration at the same time. If funds for
public interest law become more scarce, the convictions of these
lawyers will be put to a more severe test.
While existing OFO-funded legal services programs are probably
secure over the short run, even these programs are now suffering the
effects of an economy drive which invariably hits social welfare pro-
grams the hardest. Foundation funds are unreliable at best, and would
be severely curtailed by an economic depression or by a political
reaction to zealous efforts by public interest lawyers in controversial
causes. These factors alone ensure that the practice of public interest
law, if it is to survive at all, will have to seek new forms and sources
of financing. Edgar and Jean Cahn suggest that the resources for
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public interest law will come from law schools and commercial law
firms.1 9 We believe, however, that neither of these institutions will
prove well suited to handle some aspects of the work now performed
by the lawyers we interviewed, particularly where total devotion to
the needs of a constituency is required; and, perhaps more important,
that law firms and law schools, at least as presently constituted, cannot
satisfy what we have described as the second energizing force behind
public interest law firms-namely, the search by young lawyers for a
professional role fully integrated with their personal values. For those
lawyers who wish to devote their efforts to serving underrepresented
interests without government support, one hope lies in the develop-
ment of community groups and citizens' organizations which can
afford legal representation. Even if such a development does occur,
however, it is likely that lawyers who base their practice upon on-
going relationships with these groups will do so at a personal financial
sacrifice. The next few years will probably see a greater number of
firms founded by relatively young lawyers which, like the large com-
mercial firms, will combine public interest activity with fee-generating
work for private individuals or businesses, but which, unlike the es-
tablished firms, will regard public interest work as their primary
commitment, and will refuse to accept paying clients whose interests
conflict with the lawyers' sense of what is best for society.
The unstable financial base of public interest lawyers heightens the
significance of the reaction of government and the organized bar to
the needs which those lawyers are attempting to meet. There is the
possibility that a new and vigorous national administration will launch
an effort to take on some of the functions presently performed by
public interest law firms. Several of the lawyers we interviewed sug-
gested that the current flowering of public interest firms, and tie
agitation within commercial firms to undertake more pro bono ac-
tivities, is directly related to the present unattractiveness of govern-
ment service to highly motivated, socially conscious lawyers. If an
administration with different priorities were to take office, many of
the lawyers now in foundation-funded or commercial firms might
quickly join up. The prospects of such a development, of course, are
highly speculative.
Commercial law firms and the organized bar can themselves do much
to alleviate the plight of the under-represented. But just as important as
the development of pro bono programs within their own firms will be
119. Cahn & Calm, supra note 115, at 1024.
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the attitudes of members of the private bar toward separate public
interest law firms. Ralph Nader, in a recent New Republic article, has
predicted polarization, with the lines becoming more sharply drawn
between establishment private firms and crusading public interest law-
yers. 20 The reaction of conservative forces within the bar to the
public interest law movement is well illustrated by the resistance of the
California bar to the funding of California Rural Legal Assistance.
When Sargent Shriver had decided to fund ORLA, he sent Clinton
Bamburger, then head of OEO Legal Services, to make a presentation
to the Board of Governors of the California State Bar Association. The
lawyers on the Board of Governors were especially worried that the
creation of ORLA would upset the "balance" of power between grape
growers-their own traditional clients-and farm workers. At a
luncheon after the presentation, one member of the Board told Barn.
burger that CRLA should not be supported because it was a "social
experiment" which required the bar to "take sides in an economic
struggle still pending." Back at OEO, Shriver remarked that this was
the best one-line definition of the War on Poverty he had yet heard.121
Further developments in the practice of public interest law will also
test the attitudes of more progressive members of the bar. The current
controversy over the courtroom conduct of defense counsel in political
trials may lead to a more fundamental discussion of the proper scope
of advocacy, as the public interest lawyer's insistence upon being more
than a "value-neutral professional," upon acting in accord with his own
moral sense as well in compliance with the code of professional conduct,
is recognized as a frontal challenge to the traditional self-image of the
bar. It seems clear to the authors that a crusade against the more radical
elements of the bar can only hurt the profession and defeat the very
ends which the bar would serve, while a vigorous defense of their
efforts, through a more flexible definition of the professional role, can
protect these lawyers against an inevitable political reaction.
So long as there continues to be a huge disparity in legal resources
available to different interest groups in our society, the public in-
terest law movement is likely to continue in some form. But beyond
120. Nader, Law Schools and the Law Firms, THE Nmv REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 1969,
at 20 (reprinted at 54 MINN. L. Ray. 493 (1970).
121.The conservative reaction is also illustrated by the narrow defeat of thc Murphy
Amendment, which the organized bar, to its credit, officially opposed, and by the nem
restrictions on the activities of private foundations embodied in the 1970 Tax Reform
Act. See pp. 1114-15 supra.
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this probability, the future of public interest lawyers seems no less
murky than the future of the rest of our very troubled society.
APPENDIX
Interviews were conducted for this project during the first four
months of 1970. No attempt was made to compile a complete list of
"public interest lawyers," and it is doubtful whether the authors could
agree on a definition of public interest law which would make such
a list possible. Our self-conscious bias was to talk with the leaders and
most publicized lawyers in the public interest area. A more compre-
hensive study would of course have to be based upon a more complete
interview sample. Special emphasis might be directed to the growing
number of minority group public interest lawyers; to the rank and
file of the larger organizations, who may view this field very differently
from the "chiefs"; and to the client groups themselves, who will
no doubt play a crucial role in the development of public interest
law. Despite the limitations of our research, the authors feel that the
interviews we conducted constitute a rich and fascinating material for
study, and that the variety of goals, activities, sources of funding,
kinds of clients, and life styles exhibited by our interviewees provide
a fine starting point for a description and analysis of the new public
interest lawyers.
The authors conducted in-depth interviews with the following
lawyers: Malcolm Baldwin, The Conservation Foundation, Washing-
ton, D.C.; Gary Bellow, formerly of California Rural Legal Assistance
and now Professor of Law at the University of Southern California
and consultant to the Western Center on Law and Poverty, Los
Angeles, Calif.; Edgar Cahn, Citizens Advocate Center, Washington,
D.C.; Jean Camper Cahn, Urban Law Institute, Washington, D.C.;
Marian Wright Edelman, Washington Research Project, Washington,
D.C.; Peter Edelman, Robert F. Kennedy Foundation, Washington,
D.C.; John Flym, Flym, Zalkind & Silverglate, Boston, Mass.; Monroe
Freedman, Philip Stern Community Law Office, Washington, D.C.;
Ann Garfinlde and Fred Cohn, Lefcourt, Garfinlde, Crain, Cohn,
Sandler, Lefcourt, Karft 8c Stolar, New York City; Jack Greenberg,
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., New York City;
Mary Beth Halloran, Neighborhood Legal Services Program, Washing-
ton, D.C.; Charles Halpern, Center for Law and Social Policy,
Washington, D.C.; George Johnson, American Independent Move-
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ment, New Haven, Conn.; Don Kates, California Rural Legal Assis-
tance, Gilroy, Calif.; Lloyd Lynford and David Brower, Friends of
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